The Wintergarden, a traditionally supplemental function, becomes the central organizing space of the European Solidarity Center in Gdansk. It is a garden microclimate intended for contemplation and relaxation which is simultaneously interior and exterior, natural and artificial. Suspended from the Shell, the Wintergarden can be seen from many spaces in the building and it contributes significantly to the overall atmosphere of the building.

Solidarity as attitude to life. In the organising world, Europe is living in social market economies, the main economic model used in Western and Northern Europe. The social market economy seeks a middle path between socialism and capitalism (i.e. a mixed economy) and aims at maintaining a balance between a high rate of economic growth, low inflation, low levels of unemployment, good working conditions, social welfare, and public services, by using state intervention.
Basically respecting the free market, the social market economy is opposed to both a planned economy and laissez-faire capitalism.

Globalisation is an opportunity for economic and social progress and yet many citizens across the European Union apprehend it and tear its negative social impact. Solidarity and social rights are indivisible values on which the European Union is founded. Creating necessary conditions for citizens to make the most of the opportunities offered by globalisation, is therefore committed by policy makers and the Union.

If we look at the development of the eurozone in the past, we can draw two conclusions from our observations. The sovereign debt crisis has imparted a fresh thrust to the strengthening of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), fostering the kind of progress that would have been unthinkable until only shortly before the crisis. Yet despite this progress, the crisis has worsened over time because the responses adopted have been both belated and insufficient

With the economic and financial crisis having hit European countries in different ways since 2008, the EU is considering how far each country is responsible and what kind of solidarity is needed to overcome this challenge. Europeans have hastily set up solidarity mechanisms that their monetary union was lacking. Questions about legitimacy and the limits of European solidarity are now very much being asked out in the open. They are all the more crucial as they generate tensions in national public opinions and among European political decision-makers. These tensions are not just about macroeconomic issues but have recently been about solidarity mechanisms put in place in the “Schengen area” and also relate to the different extents of the other EU interventions, such as in the area of agriculture or energy. Notre Europe, the Paris thinktank, published an interesting and actual study on solidarity within the Eurozone: ' Solidarity within the Eurozone: how much, what for, for how long?'
Notre Europe, the Paris think tank, has released an interesting and timely study on solidarity within the Eurozone. The authors, Sofia Fernandes and Eulalia Rubio, first take the concept of solidarity under the microscope. They distinguish two motives for inter-state solidarity, reciprocity and enlightened self-interest.
Reciprocity underlies traditional insurance systems.
It is about spreading risk between equals. Enlightened self-interest draws the relationship between strong and weak, rich and poor. The strong / rich have an interest in a certain consistency and stability of the whole group.
Solidarity is often - even within the EU - coupled with conditionality. The conditional-of serves two, partly conflicting goals:

1. to make sure that the auxiliary is used as effectively as possible, and
the help discourage the risk of moral hazard limit. And coordination is needed to certain risks or undesirable to reduce differences within the group.

The Maastricht Treaty provided for EMU solidarity mechanisms (the Fund) of coordination requirements (no excessive deficits) and a no bail-out clause to strengthen fiscal discipline. As is well known that discipline proved ineffective. That was partly undermined by financial markets for years hardly differed between the bonds of eurozone countries. This "piggybacking" of countries with high debt ratio would have a form of implicit call to solidarity - with the long term adverse effects.

After the outbreak of the crisis, the EU Member States and the Eurozone with the new emergency funds, not previously provided mechanisms for inter-state solidarity should create. They were thereby driven by enlightened self-interest: the prevention of further spread of the debt crisis. But the authors find that not a good diagnosis of the crisis was made because some system causes about being overlooked.

The first stems from the fact that the EMU debt issued in a currency which it does not have full control (a point which Paul de Grauwe previously noted). That makes a liquidity problem can quickly degenerate into a solvency problem.
The second system cause has to do with inadequate banking supervision at EU level.
And actually, the political leaders not fulfilled their promise that they would do everything necessary to default by a Member State and breakup of the eurozone to avoid. The emergency funds are therefore not large enough and effective enough usable.

Fernandes and Rubio advocate the following forms of solidarity. In the short term is important because of enlightened self interest, the bond markets of EMU countries to stabilize and growth recovery in the peripheral EMU countries. For quick stabilization of the bond are two options: a massive intervention by the ECB (acting as lender of last resort would act) or the introduction of cross-guarantees by the Member States of the euro area in the context of Eurobonds . On balance it seems preferable to theauthors proceed to (a temporary system) Eurobonds. Previously, a group of ELEC (the European League of Economic Cooperation) recently proposed that in this study is not known but on the EBN website can be found.

How can growth recovery in the peripheral EMU countries be promoted? Structural reforms are therefore important, but these often take time to bear fruit. In the short term, additional growth impetus. Strong EMU countries would therefore not have to economize now. Furthermore, the access of peripheral countries to the available structural and cohesion funds should be increased (as in the AIV advisory letter to a strengthened financial and economic governance in the EU advocates).

In the short term aid - whether in the form of guarantees - badly. Who does not 'transfer union' will, to invest in a better policy coordination in EMU. That is the challenge for the longer term. To increase the resilience of EMU strengthening, do the authors propose a more effective use of structural and cohesion funds for a permanent system of Eurobonds for an EMU-wide insurance for bank deposits and a provision for the EMU is to be in exceptional circumstances to a joint commitment of budgetary resources.

Rightly, the study concludes that the European debt crisis, no magic, free solution has. The next time a special use of non-reciprocal solidarity necessary for EMU to bring back into safe waters. But apart from this crisis, the EMU needs to create mechanisms for solidarity - not a transfer union to create, but as mutual guarantee against risks.


TheBertelsmann Stiftung discusses the social dimension of the new European economic governance through essays. European Movement Netherlands summarized the essays as follows: ' In 'Solidarity for Sale?' it is sketched that social policies by increasing financial discipline within the EU can come in a fix. They emphasize that there is a shared interest in well-functioning, efficient systems of public services at national level - both in terms of social inclusion as macroeconomic stability in the eurozone. This can be expressed in a 'Social Investment Pact' to complement the Euro Plus Pact. Both in national budgets as in the EU budget should be given sufficient priority to investing in people, from preschool education to sustainable employability of older people.

The most interesting is the contribution of Kalypso Nicolaïdis Viehoff and Juri (both working in Oxford) on 'sustainable solidarity' in Europe after the crisis. They dissect the concept of solidarity. It is to start a hybrid concept that both observable social behavior as the normative basis sure can describe. Solidarity is about the relations between (groups of) people, but from behavior alone can not establish whether there is an expression of solidarity.

The authors propose solidarity emphatically not the same as altruism, but places it in a.tension between, on the one axis, self-interest and community thinking, and along the other axis, political commitment and altruism. Relations of solidarity contribute to the regulatory elements of each of these four explanations in themselves. Solidarity in the EU/ euro area see it primarily as a matter of a bit wider and longer-term perspective of their own interests, they will see on the highest economic benefits for the various national interests in the short term.

A key question is topical: we are genuinely interested in the future prosperity of other EU countries, including Greece? And we're able to - non-prescribed but not free - solidarity also well organized in a Union of 27 Member States? How does (in solidarity) to the EU Member States, each of which a 'community solidarity' forms? The authors emphasize that even within Member States solidarity must undergo several steps of scaling to social justice at national level to achieve. Thus, they consider the extent to which a (single) step can be further put to the institutionalization of solidarity, especially as an empirical matter. Nicolaïdis Viehoff and conclude their contribution with four principles for action:

1. Solidarity viewed from a long-term perspective on the sustainability of the European project (and not as a temporary solution);
2. Europe is a Union, no unity, and the EU based on mutual recognition and justification;
3. Solidarity is conditional, depending on the use to which the receiving party makes of them;
4. Solidarity can not be enforced, but is a choice - and that goes for institutionalization of solidarity within the EU.

"Solidarity in the European Union must rest on Institutions That ensure its constantly renewed and fairness to all sides. The choice for sustainable Solidarity is at That price ".

Andrew Watt (researcher at the European Trade Union Institute) takes as its starting point that issues of competitiveness and resulting government debt "symmetric", and therefore also symmetrical adjustments by deficit and surplus countries questions. It is certainly in the interest of surplus countries to promote the necessary changes in the deficit countries as far and as fast as possible in an environment of growth can take place. But in doing it better fits the image of panning left behind than of leveling to an average for Europe in the global economy does not help.

Gordon Bajnaj (Prime Minister of Hungary 2009-2010) places the current crisis in Europe or in the context of globalization. This necessitates adjustment of the European 'earnings'. Europe is facing five challenges: lower growth, reverse social mobility, intergenerational conflict, populism, protectionism, isolationism, nationalism, and global power shifts. And Europe is vulnerable because halfhearted, half thought, half explained that integration is therefore halfway continue stabbing. Bajnaj calls for further integration, agile to respond to economic challenges and to ensure continuity, to counterbalance the short-winded political cycles in the States. That does require strengthening the democratic legitimacy of decision-making (how, exactly, remains vague).


What forms the basis of solidarity varies between societies. In some less complex societies it may be mainly based around kinship and shared values. In more complex societies there are various theories as to what contributes the sense of social solidarity. Emile Durkheim introduced the terms "mechanical" and "organic" solidarity as part of his theory of the development of societies. In a society exhibiting mechanical solidarity, its cohesion and integration comes from homogeneity of individuals - people feel connected through similar work, educational and religious training, and lifestyle. Mechanical solidarity normally operates in "traditional" and small scale societies. Organic solidarity comes from the interdependence that arises from specialization of work and the complementarities between people - a development which occurs in "modern" and "industrial" societies.

'Gold standard' for social investment in human capital must assume, based on a substantial expansion of cross-border programs for education and training. An annual investment of 40 to 50 billion (0.3 percent of GDP in the EU) would 4-5000000 cross 'placements' (full-and part-time) per year could bring. This would create a European labor market, with the necessary cross-border mobility can be encouraged. The training programs may all be directed at removing bottlenecks in labor markets. The authors find a strong commitment of the EU justified because of the significant external effects of education and training are linked. A subsidiarity test would such an EU policy eyes higher throw than the current agricultural policy. This interesting proposal of Rossi and Her deserves further elaboration and consideration.
solidarity diamond