

Closing the Community Deficit in the EU

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The main challenge currently facing the EU is a community deficit: the low valuation the majority of its citizens accord the evolving collectivity. The EU is challenged by the mismatch between its increasing supranational decision making and the strong loyalties of its citizens to their respective nation states.¹ To deal with this community deficit, the EU must either introduce strong measures of community building or else significantly scale back its plans for action in unison.

I first briefly cite illustrative data to show that there is a considerable level of disaffection from the EU project and the EU institutions (section 1). I then turn to examine the first set of measures needed to reduce the strain on the EU by scaling back *for the near future* those provisions that alienate many citizens (section 2). A second set of measures is needed to build up citizens' commitment to the EU, by fostering public dialogue, developing a common European media and language, and holding EU-wide elections (section 3).

1. Signs of disaffection

Given that it is widely agreed that there is a considerable level of disaffection from the EU project and the EU authorities, I merely provide a few illustrative pieces of evidence rather than review the considerable literature on the subject.²

¹ On supranational communities see Amitai Etzioni, *From Empire to Community*, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

² For a review of this literature, see e.g. Lauren McLaren, "Explaining Mass-level Euroscepticism: Identity, Interests, and Institutional Distrust", *Acta Politica*, 42:2-3, July 2007, pp. 233-251.

A 2002 study shows that "a majority of West Europeans does not believe that the EU represents them; these perceptions not only increase dissatisfaction with the current EU-framework but also lower support for a future, EU-wide government."³ Those few nations in which the majority felt well-represented by the EU are small and possess limited political clout, such as Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland. (Notably, Ireland recently endangered the movement towards deepening by voting down the Lisbon Treaty in 2008.) The largest and most powerful nations such as France, Germany and the UK had much lower rates of support.⁴ More recently, a study has shown that "the largest group of Europeans remains hesitant about European integration, either expressing support or opposition for either deepening or widening."⁵ And a 2008 study demonstrates that "there has been a dramatic collapse in the popular legitimacy of the EU since the early 1990s".⁶

This euroscepticism, as it is commonly referred to, seems to be on the rise and is reported to be tied to national identities that have become both stronger and more

³ Robert Rohrschneider, "The Democracy Deficit and Mass Support for an EU-wide Government," *American Journal of Political Science*, 46:2, April 2002, pp. 463-475.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 467.

⁵ Jeffrey Karp and Shaun Bowler, "Broadening and deepening or broadening versus deepening: The question of enlargement and Europe's 'hesitant Europeans'", *European Journal of Political Research* 45, 2006, pp. 369-390.

⁶ Simon Hix, *What's wrong with the European Union and how to Fix it*, Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008, p. 51.

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exclusive.⁷ This trend is especially significant in Germany, where people had long shied away from national identification after World War II, preferring to see themselves as European. True, citizens of several EU member states with weak, corrupt or inefficient national institutions – Italy for instance – are more likely to favour EU institutions, viewing them as less corrupt and more efficient.⁸ This, however, is not the case for the majority of EU citizens.⁹ True, many Europeans would like the EU to do more in matters concerning foreign policy; for instance, some suggest that a majority of Europeans would likely favour the creation of a common EU diplomatic service, a European FBI and common EU representation in international organisations to speak with one voice. However, support for such moves might quickly recede if ‘Brussels’ were to take specific steps in these matters, for instance, by ruling that EU involvement in Afghanistan must be doubled and demanding that each member nation commit a given number of troops to the effort, or by confronting Russia regarding its intervention in Georgia, or by substantially increasing defence spending.

In the 2004 European Parliament elections, anti-EU parties had their strongest showing yet. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which demands Britain’s full withdrawal from the EU, took 12 seats in the Parliament, while the mainstream but largely eurosceptic Conservatives took 27. In Poland, the anti-EU League of Polish Families took more seats than all parties but one. The Movement for France, which rejects both the euro and France’s EU membership, held onto its three seats, and the Swedish anti-EU June Movement won 3 seats.¹⁰

⁷ See e.g. Adam Luedke, “European Integration, Public Opinion and Immigration Policy: Testing the Impact of National Identity”, *European Union Politics*, 6:1, 2005, pp. 83-112; Sean Carey, “Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?”, *European Union Politics* 3:4, 2002, pp. 387-413; Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Europe’s Blues: Theoretical Soul-searching after the Rejection of the European Constitution”, *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39, 2006, pp. 247-250; Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration”, *European Union Politics* 6, 2005, pp. 419-443; Juan Diez Medrano, *Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003; Richard Herrmann, Marilynn Brewer and Thomas Risse (eds), *Identities in Europe and the Institutions of the European Union*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004; Lauren McLaren, “Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?”, *Journal of Politics* 64, 2002, pp. 551-66.

⁸ Rohrschneider, op. cit.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ William Horsley, “Eurosceptics storm the citadel”, British Broadcasting Corporation, 14 June 2004 (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3806503.stm> Accessed: 20 August 2008).

True, the treaties that were rejected first by the French and the Dutch and later by the Irish, lost by a small margin. But one cannot ignore the fact that, in 2008, 26 out of 27 national governments – including 11 that had previously committed to doing so – did not allow their citizens to vote on the Lisbon Treaty, presumably fearing its rejection. Most recently, the Danish government decided to defer “indefinitely” a referendum on three measures that would have deepened Danish involvement in the EU.¹¹

Others have reached similar conclusions. Andrew Moravcsik, of Harvard University, writes:

For the first time in a generation, European elites and public outside the extreme Right and Left expressed fundamental doubts about the desirability of major steps toward European Integration...The polarization of public and elite opinion appears to be eroding the broad consensus that supported integration for the past three decades.¹²

And, he concludes: “There is considerable evidence that [European voters] oppose integration today. Hence, in the short term, democratization is almost certain to undermine integration.”¹³

Some argue that popular alienation from the EU stems in large part from political cues given by national elites who see the rise of the EU as a threat to their power.¹⁴ Others propose that economic factors are key in explaining popular opinion.¹⁵ Such explanations speak not to the end state but merely to the causes of disaffection, of which there are clearly several. The fact, though, remains that a substantial and seemingly growing number of European citizens are alienated from the EU project and the EU institutions.

To reiterate, the evidence presented here is intended merely to illustrate the point at issue, which, in any case, seems to be fairly well established.

2. Measures to reduce strain and alienation: A grand EU pause

To treat this disaffection, the EU needs to adopt the following measures, amounting to a consolidation period or a grand ‘pause’, before further steps can be taken that significantly diminish national sovereignty.

¹¹ “Hoist by its own policy”, *The Economist*, 16 August 2008, pp. 53-54.

¹² Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe’s Integration at Century’s End,” in Andrew Moravcsik (ed.), *Centralization or Fragmentation?: Europe Facing the Challenges of Deepening, Diversity and Democracy*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998, pp. 1-58:4.

¹³ Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁴ Hooghe and Marks, “Calculation, Community and Cues”, op. cit.

¹⁵ McLaren, “Explaining Mass-Level Euroskepticism”, op. cit.

a. Defer enlargement

The EU needs to defer additional enlargement for a decade to allow for consolidation. Given that the negotiations for new membership strain the EU long before the members are actually admitted, such considerations also need to be suspended. Enlargement strains the community in two significant ways: i) increasing the sheer numbers of any group renders collective decision-making more difficult and ii) given the cultural, historical, political and linguistic differences between the current and potential members, further enlargement would increase the already high level of heterogeneity of the EU, which, as Communitarians have long shown, is antithetical to community-building.¹⁶ Only after reducing the current high level of heterogeneity can more members be added – or even considered – without further undermining community-building.

Many scholars and public officials who favour enlargement point to the several commendable effects that the offer of potential EU membership has on the countries that are keen to join and expect to become members of the EU. Some have shown that the prospect and/or conditions of accession to the EU provide sufficient incentives for significant democratisation and liberalisation.¹⁷ However, it is far from obvious that the EU should endanger its future in order to advance reforms in other countries. Moreover, saving the EU from its own altruism by introducing a temporary pause on enlargement is needed not merely for the sake of its current members, but also to nurture the community that these other countries seek to join. While it may be, in some sense, noble to tear down the pillars that uphold your house in order to provide logs for a new friend's fireplace, this is hardly the case if you have just invited him to move into the same house.

b. Delay deepening

Several analysts and leaders have correctly identified a need for significant increases in the scope and import of supranational decision-making.¹⁸ They seek a state of

¹⁶ See e.g. Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification Revisited: On Building Supranational Communities*, New York, NY: Lexington Books, 2001.

¹⁷ See e.g. Wojciech Sadurski, Adam Czarnota, and Martin Krygier (eds), *Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law?: The Impact of EU Enlargement for the Rule of Law, Democracy and Constitutionalism in Post-Communist Legal Orders*, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer Publishing Company, 2006; Tim Houghton, "When Does the EU Make a Difference? Conditionality and the Accession Process in Central and Eastern Europe", *Political Studies Review* 5:2, 2007, pp 233-246; Geoffrey Pridham, "European Union Accession Dynamics and Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Future Perspectives", *Government and Opposition*, 41:3, June 2006, pp. 373-400.

¹⁸ I use the term "supranationality" to characterise a political body that has acquired some of the attributes usually associated

affairs wherein EU organs could speak in one voice for the whole community and could render more important decisions on the basis of majority rule, rather than requiring the unanimous consent of all the member states. However, the significant reduction in the sovereignty of the member nations that such changes entail requires a higher level of citizen commitment to the EU than currently exists.¹⁹

Deepening entails exacting considerable sacrifices by some members of the collectivity that predominantly benefit others. Thus, for example, if stronger EU-wide measures were adopted to slow down inflation, some members would as a result likely experience much slower growth, while others, whose growth was slower to begin with, might not be much affected. If stronger anti-terrorism measures were introduced across the EU, some member nations would have to adopt considerable changes to their domestic laws and in the way authorities conduct themselves – changes that nations with strong civil rights traditions are likely to find very troubling – while other nations that had already recalibrated their anti-terrorism regimes would be relatively unaffected. Moreover, for EU-wide programmes, financial costs and benefits will also be unequally distributed; some nations will mostly pay while other member nations mostly benefit from EU-wide income and wealth transfer.

Such inequalities of burdens and benefits are routinely accepted within well established nations. Thus, in the United States, few complain that southern states contribute less to federal revenues while gaining a disproportionate share of federal outlays. After reunification, Germany's western states contributed very large amounts to the new lands', the eastern states. However, if the beneficiaries are not considered parts of one's community, there is a much lower tolerance for such reallocations and wealth transfers. Given that the majority of the EU citizens seem not ready to make such sacrifices on a growing scale, deepening has to be delayed until community commitments are enhanced.

c. Slow down the Commission

The EU institutions, especially the Commission, have acted on a significant number of occasions in ways that

with a nation, such as political loyalty and decision-making power – based not on an aggregate of national decisions or those made by representatives of the member states, but rather on those made by the supranational bodies themselves. It is useful to think about supranationality as a composite of several elements. For more discussion, see Etzioni *From Empire to Community*, op. cit., Ch. 12.

¹⁹ For a discussion of the strains on the EU caused by integration discussions, see Richard H. Roberts, "Gaia and Europe: Religion and Legitimation Crisis in the 'New Europe'", in Ralf Rogowski and Charles Turner (eds), *The Shape of the New Europe*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Moravcsik "Europe's Integration at Century's End", op. cit., p. 3 & p. 5.

alienate the citizens from the EU project, as described below:

i) *Negotiations* about major additions and changes to EU treaties and institutions have often been conducted in off-the-record meetings, employing highly legalistic and technical terms or obfuscating language. French President Nicolas Sarkozy expressed this point well when he interpreted the 2008 Irish ‘no’ vote on the Lisbon Treaty as a rejection of a “...certain Europe that is too technocratic, too abstract, too distant.”²⁰

To reduce citizen alienation, important decisions are best preceded by consensus-building (discussed below). Granted, this democratisation would substantially reduce the speed and scope of the actions that the Commission can undertake. This trade-off, though, can no longer be avoided.

ii) The European Commission has often *acted* below the radar, introducing numerous EU-wide measures with little or no prior public notification, consensus-building or even public disclosure after the fact. To reduce alienation the Commission will have to become more transparent, through measures such as conducting more open meetings, posting advance notice, granting time for public commentary and laying out its plan for action in terms readily understood by the public.

iii) Enforcement of the measures already in place has been highly uneven (sometimes referred to as the ‘compliance gap’).²¹ Hence, citizens of nations with relatively high compliance levels feel exploited. To reduce citizen alienation, the EU should dedicate more resources to reduce the compliance gap. This, in turn, may entail reducing the number of regulations, instructions and other measures the Commission can issue each year – again, a trade-off that seems cannot long be avoided.

iv) EU officials, as well as national leaders who support the EU project, have shown by word and deed a disrespect for the people – and the democratic process.²² I already referred to the broken promises of submitting new treaties to referendums. The same disrespectful attitude is revealed when a treaty is resubmitted for a vote soon after being voted down, with only minor modifications, if any. One gets the impression that some EU officials would like to repeatedly submit the same measures to the electorate time and again until they get the desired result. Four weeks after Ireland’s voters had

²⁰ “Nicolas Sarkozy’s European apotheosis”, *The Economist*, 28 June 2008, p. 56.

²¹ For four examples of ineffective implementation of EU policy, see Christoph Knill, “European Politics: Impact of National Administrative Traditions”, *Journal of Public Policy* 18:1, January-April 1998, pp. 1-28.

²² For more discussion, see Marion Demossier, “Introduction” in Demossier (ed.), *The European Puzzle: The Political Restructuring of Cultural Identities at a Time of Transition*, New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2007, pp. 2-3.

rejected the Lisbon Treaty, Sarkozy, privately stated that the Irish would have to vote again.²³ Lest one think the recent Irish vote is a singular occurrence, the same treatment was given to Irish voters when they rejected the Nice Treaty in 2001 and to Danish voters when they rejected the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.²⁴ Beyond the often-cited democratic deficit,²⁵ an attitude of superiority among some officials and leaders is hurting the EU project. Following Ireland’s recent vote against the Lisbon Treaty, German interior minister Wolfgang Schäuble grumbled publicly about “letting a few million Irish make decisions for 495 million Europeans.”²⁶ The Commission and other EU authorities best not promote policies and changes in institutions that the majority of the citizens of the EU have shown they reject.

At the same time, if leaders feel that the public sentiments are untutored and antithetical to the common good, they need not simply yield to these preferences. EU officials can work to gain the support of the citizens for the courses of action they believe ought to be followed. If, at the end of the day, these officials fail to be persuasive, they best give way. Although extended EU-building requires greatly reducing the democratic deficit through the measures listed above, these by themselves will not suffice unless the community deficit is curtailed.²⁷

3. Measures that build community

a. Foster EU-wide public dialogues

Societies, even ones as large as the United States, engage in dialogues about public policies. Typically, just one or two topics top the public dialogue agenda, for instance, whether or not to allow gay marriages or whether the death penalty should be tolerated. These dialogues

²³ “Vote Early, Vote Often,” *The Economist*, 24 July 2008 (available at http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11792298).

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ See e.g. Jonathan Bowman, “The European Union Democratic Deficit: Federalists, Sceptics, and Revisionists”, *European Journal of Political Theory*, 5:2, 2006, pp. 191-212; Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, “Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU”, *European Governance Papers* C-05-02, 14 March 2005; Myrto Tsakatika, “Governance vs. politics: the European Union’s constitutive ‘democratic deficit’”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14:6, September 2007, pp. 867-885.

²⁶ Derek Scally, “Minister suggests Ireland take a 'break' from EU CDU distances itself from comments”, *Irish Times*, 16 June 2008 (<http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2008/0616/1213369968838.html>).

²⁷ For more discussion, see Amitai Etzioni, “The Community Deficit”, *The Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45:1, 2007, pp. 23-42; see also Moravcsik, “Europe’s Integration at Century’s End”, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

mainly concern values and are not dominated by considerations of facts. They often seem endless and impassionate, but actually frequently lead to new, widely shared public understandings. Such understandings, in turn, often provide a well-grounded basis for changes in public policy and institutions; they generate new sources of legitimacy. In the United States, for instance, public dialogues prepared the ground for new legislation to protect the environment and for the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency. Such dialogues also preceded the abolition of legal segregation and the forming of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.²⁸

The fact that the majority of EU citizens feel ill-informed about the EU and the actions of its various institutions only enhances the need to promote dialogue.²⁹

Referendums have long been criticised as anti-democratic for, among other concerns, their tendency to express the passion of the moment rather than the results of deliberations.³⁰ Hence the need to allow for dialogues that provide periods during which people can consult with each other and their leaders before referendums take place. Announcing that a given matter will be subject to a binding vote a number of months down the road is an effective way to trigger discussion.

Public dialogues and some referendums do take place in Europe, but they are, as a rule, conducted within each nation. This is in part because people still see themselves as primarily citizens of this or that nation rather than as Europeans, and in part because the points of closure – the endpoints or changes in public policy that these dialogues lead to or support – often are on the national level rather than EU-wide. To build the support needed for enhanced supranational institutions and decision-making of the EU, public dialogues and referendums best take place in all member nations at the same time and be tied to decisions to be made on the EU and not the national level.

The issues to be discussed and voted on at an EU-wide level need to be salient enough to draw the people into participating. Suggested changes in immigration policies are an obvious example. Finally, to succeed, participating citizens must be able to trust that the results of these referendums will be fully binding, that the EU officials will heed them rather than seek to work their way around them.

²⁸ For more discussion on Moral Dialogues, see Amitai Etzioni, *The New Golden Rule*, New York, NY: Basic Books, 1996.

²⁹ “The European Parliament”, Special Eurobarometer 288 / Wave 68.1, *TNS Opinion and Social*, March, 2008; “The Future of Europe”, Special Eurobarometer, 251 / Wave 65.1, *TNS Opinion and Social*, May 2006.

³⁰ For more on this and other failures of the EU referendum process, see Gary Marks, “The EU’s Direct Democratic Surplus”, paper delivered at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, 28-31 August 2008.

b. Develop EU-wide media and language

Citizens see the EU largely through their respective national and cultural lenses. For a shift in orientation to occur, for more people to adopt a community-wide perspective, some form of a shared media is needed, which can be accessed by citizens in different parts of the EU. Unfortunately, various attempts to fashion a European newspaper have not truly taken off. The same holds for other media, such as television and radio. The internet fragments the public more than it builds one shared audience. The EU should create a sort of European Broadcasting Agency, modelled on the BBC, which would draw on public budgets but have autonomous control of the content of the broadcasts. Its mandate would be to provide news and interpret it from a European perspective. (From this viewpoint it might be of interest to compare *Foreign Affairs*, which is published from an American perspective, with *Foreign Policy*, which deliberately recast itself to adopt a global perspective.) It would also include brief items about what is happening in the various member states, as if they were parts of the same country, somewhat the way the American newspaper *USA Today* provides news about the 50 American states.³¹

Initially, EU-wide broadcasts may well have to be translated into the 23 languages that are the spoken by the EU citizens. However, if the EU is to move towards becoming more of a community, it would be much assisted if all the citizens would learn the same language. Historically, coming to share a language has played a key role in many community-building endeavours. In the EU, though, reference is not to developing *one* primary tongue, *but to one in addition to it*, in other words, a common second language. English is the only serious candidate for this position, but so far France, Germany and Italy, among others, have strongly opposed this development, thus slowing down the development of a shared European second language.³²

c. EU-wide voting

As EU consensus solidifies, the EU should move towards EU-wide voting on EU candidates, rather than the current system in which votes for the EU Parliament are still conducted largely for national candidates, on national bases. Currently, most candidates running for a seat in the

³¹ For another perspective on the media’s role in building trust for European institutions, see Patrick Bijssmans and Christina Altieds, “Bridging the Gap between EU Politics and Citizens? The European Commission, National Media and EU Affairs in the Public Sphere,” *Journal of European Integration*, 29:3, July 2007, pp. 323-340.

³² For more discussion, see Amitai Etzioni, “A Global, Community Building Language”, *International Studies Perspectives*, 9:2, May 2008, pp. 113-127; Amitai Etzioni, “Lost in too many translations”, *The European Voice*, 17 July 2008.

European Parliament are put up by national parties, and campaign only in their home country. In the European Parliament, most ‘European parties’ are largely made of alliances between pre-existing national parties; they function less like political parties and more like international coalitions. A switch to European parties and candidates raises numerous issues concerning whether different weight should be assigned to the voters of various countries and ways to protect minorities. These two complex points require separate treatment.

d. Functionalism and symbolism are lagging factors

Two factors that some hypothesised would serve as community-builders have carried little weight so far, but they are likely to carry more as EU-wide shared public understanding, dialogue, media, language, and voting evolve.

First, some expected the shift of decision-making power to ‘Brussels’ to lead to a shift in people’s commitment to the EU (a thesis referred to sometimes as neofunctionalism).³³ So far, though, when functions were shifted to EU-wide institutions without first building up consensus and legitimacy, these shifts generated more alienation than enhanced commitment to the community. If the ground was properly prepared, neofunctionalism would be much more likely to succeed. Neofunctionalism, thus, turns out to be a lagging rather than a leading factor.

The same holds for symbolism. The EU has tried to build community by promoting symbols that express the new collectivity, such as the EU flag, a European hymn, EU markings on motor vehicle license plates, the marking of cultural and historical sites, and others.³⁴ So far these symbols have not carried much weight in terms of building a commitment to the EU.³⁵ Such symbols can

express commitments once they are in place, and even *enhance* them to some extent once they are evolving. They cannot engender such commitment when the basic underlying public support is lacking.

Jurgen Habermas has argued that forming a constitution would lead to a crystallization of Europe in the sense of developing a unified identity and culture.³⁶ Others have pointed to the unifying, identity-building power of “constitutional moments”, of the kind the American colonies experienced in Philadelphia in 1787. Reference is to historical occasions in which different segments of a new collectivity rose to find a common cause and institutionalize an evolving core of shared values. Such “moments” do not occur in a vacuum, but typically reflect the culmination of long social and political developments that preceded them. Moreover, much of the consolidation often follows later. When neither the preparatory nor after-the-act developments are present, constitution-writing does not possess some kind of magical power to build new shared identity. The persistence of political strife and inter-tribal violence after the ratification of new constitutions in Iraq and Afghanistan, two long-established nations, is evidence for this point.

e. Unprecedented but...

Many doubt that the EU can be turned into a collectivity that has many of the elements of a national community – into a United States of Europe. There are strong reasons to expect that this opinion is a valid one. All previous attempts to form supranational communities have failed, including those of the United Arab Republic, the Federation of the West Indies, and even a much less ambitious coming together, the Nordic Council.³⁷ When nations were forced into a federation, for instance by Russia in the Soviet era, the federation came apart and the member nations were restored to full autonomy as soon as the coercive vise was broken. The same holds for Yugoslavia.

One may suggest that history is rich with cases in which previously autonomous communities merged, one way or another, to form more encompassing ones. Germany was formed by the unification of some 39 independent states;

³³ Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958; Lee McGowan, “Theorising European Integration: revisiting neofunctionalism and testing its suitability for explaining the development of EC competition policy?”, *European Integration online Papers*, 25 May 2007; Andrew Moravcsik, “The European Constitutional Compromise and the Neofunctionalist Legacy”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12:2, 2005, pp. 349-386; Joseph Nye Jr., *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*, Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1971; P.C. Schmitter, “Three Neofunctional Hypotheses about International Integration”, *International Organization* 23, 1969, pp. 297-317; P.C. Schmitter, “Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12:2, 2006, pp. 255-272.

³⁴ For a collection of scholarly essays on various issues raised by efforts to construct a European identity not based on Christianity and anti-Islamic sentiments, see Demossier (ed.), *The European Puzzle*, op. cit.

³⁵ Demossier writes: “the European Union has, over the years, put increasing emphasis on the cultural construction of the

mythical figure of the European through a range of cultural policies, but it has largely failed in its attempt to construct a shared sense of Europeanness.” Marion Demossier, “The Political Structuring of Cultural Identities” in Marion Demossier (ed.), *The European Puzzle*, op. cit., p. 50. See also C. Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, London: Routledge, 2000.

³⁶ Jurgen Habermas, “Why Europe needs a Constitution”, in *The Shape of the New Europe*, Ralf Rogowski and Charles Turner (eds), New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 25-45; Roberts, “Gaia and Europe,” op. cit., p. 148.

³⁷ For a comparative analysis of these three failed unions, see Etzioni, *Political Unification Revisited*, op. cit.

Italy, by the unification of numerous provinces and areas. The United States itself was composed of 13 colonies (though its two regions did not coalesce into one society until after the Civil War). However, all these instances of community-building took place *before nationalism took root and before the masses became actively involved in the political process*. That is, before the sense of self and the identity of the citizens became deeply associated with their nation state. Indeed, it is the building of nations, largely in the 19th and 20th centuries, that allowed the integration of pre-national communities into the new, national one.

To reiterate, there is no precedent for the citizens of a fully formed *nation* to consent to its being absorbed into a more encompassing community, or for allowing loyalty to the new community to take precedent (in cases of conflict) over current national loyalties that are deeply held. One scholar's observation about Northern Ireland applies much more widely:

...national identities so dominate the cultural identifications of border people, of all people...that, to the extent that it is acknowledged as a possible alternative, European identity is often scoffed at as little more than a tactic to get funding, or to support the European stance of a local political party.³⁸

That communities with weak identity and shared sense of self often jell only around negative causes, for instance, in opposition to some real or imaginary enemy or outsider, is a regrettable but undeniable sociological fact. Many new nations jelled in opposition to colonial powers. Hence, it is revealing that when the majority of the European citizens strongly opposed the course the United States followed in Iraq in 2003 and in the years that followed, the EU was still unable to build on this consensus to speak in one voice, to form a shared identity and policy.

One may suggest, again with regret, that the European identity is largely Christian and anti-Muslim. Soledad Garcia put it as follows:

The increasing consensus on what is considered dangerous in Western Europe (terrorism, pollution, drugs consumption, urban crime, on one side, and Islamic fundamentalism, uncontrolled immigration from certain parts of the world on the other) constitutes a substantial common ground for sharing perceptions of what we need to be protected from, not only as individuals but also as Europeans.³⁹

As Professor Ralph Grillo of the University of Sussex notes, "already by the early 1990s, fundamentalism had become 'Europe's latest 'other'...Islamism is constructed as what Europe is not, and an exclusionary European identity is projected as its opposite."⁴⁰ Margaret Thatcher even went so far as to refer to fundamentalism as the "new Bolshevism".⁴¹ So far, however, such consensus has served mainly those who wish to exclude Turkey from the EU, limit immigration and other such policies, but has not provided a new normative foundation for building a more communal EU.

If the EU is unable to engage in much stronger and more affirmative community-building, if there is no significantly greater transfer of commitments and loyalties from the citizens of the member nations to the new evolving political community, the EU will be unable to sustain the kind of encompassing, significant and salient collective public policies and endeavours it seeks to advance. The EU needs either to move up to a higher level of community or retreat to being a free trade zone enriched by numerous legal and administrative shared arrangements, but not much more.

The world is watching both because of the importance of the EU *per se*, and because several other regional bodies, in much earlier states of supranational development, want to learn the best ways to engage in community-building when the members of the community are nation states.

³⁸ T.M. Wilson, "Agendas in Conflict: Nation, State and Europe in the Northern Ireland Borderlands", in I. Bellier and T.M. Wilson (eds), *An Anthropology of the European Union*, Oxford: Berg, 2000, pp. 137-158, quoted in Ralph Grillo, "European Identity in a Transnational Era", in Demossier (ed.), *The European Puzzle*, op. cit., p. 78.

³⁹ S. Garcia, "Europe's Fragmented Identities and the Frontiers of Citizenship", in S. Garcia (ed.), *European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy*, London: Pinter, 1993, p. 14, quoted in Ralph Grillo, "European identity in a Transnational Era" in Marion Demossier, ed., *The European Puzzle*, op. cit., p. 78.

⁴⁰ Grillo, *ibid.*

⁴¹ Margaret Thatcher, "Islamism is the New Bolshevism," *The Guardian*, 12 February 2002, cited in Grillo, *ibid.*

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- To carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to solutions to the challenges facing Europe today.
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- To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process.
- To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business representatives across the whole of Europe.
- To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public events.

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Research Networks/Joint Initiatives

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European Climate Platform (ECP)
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