COMMON SECURITY and DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP)
     
 
The military of the European Union today comprises the several national armed forces of the Union's 27 member states, as the policy area of defence has remained primarily the domain of nation states. European integration has however been deepened in this field in recent years, with the framing of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) branch for the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the creation of separate international forces revolving around the EU's defence. A number of CSDP military operations have been deployed in recent years.

A CEPS commentary informs about CSDP that for those who believed that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was still in good shape after Libya and looked with hope at the new missions launched last summer in the Horn of Africa, South Sudan, and Niger, the unfortunate news is that the tide of events has twice washed over the CSDP in the last 12 months and barely left it standing. As its southern neighbourhood becomes more insecure and transformations in global security proceed at a swift pace, the EU must choose between being a responsible actor and living up to its rhetoric, or accepting the demise of its Common Security and Defence Policy. There may well be a third chance after Mali, but it should not be taken for granted that the CSDP will still be standing.

The EU is working on development of partial strategies in order to get overview. It has to be questioned what a threat is and we have to remind that the US also sometimes take part in EU-operations.

The page give fragments of the efforts, possibilities and barriers to establish a common security and defense policy and to make it work.


Meetings on European Security and Defence took place at CEPS, together with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung who joined the project as a partner. The aim was to deliver a set of concrete policy recommendations to High Representative. Former EU and NATO officials, well-known experts, representatives from governmental international institutions and corporations engaged in an extended discussion linking the interconnected elements of the European security agenda: global strategy, pooling and sharing of capabilities, integrated command structure, innovation and industry.
     
The need for a new strategic draft for Europe
Many domeins and levels within a lot of areas are mixed-up. That's why Europe needs a new strategic draft. But is or should be there still a role for national parliaments? This question arised in the year 2011, wherin the WEU (Western European Union) will be abolished as the website announced too (CLOSURE OF WEU ORGANS IN PARIS AND BRUSSELS. The WEU organs underwent a process of liquidation and closure. WEU will cease to exist as a Treaty-based International Organisation on 30 June 2011').

It is important that national parliaments hold their possibility to consult and to use power. On the other hand, a common European foreign policy is hardly unthinkable and allows in fact no national policies. But not all member states execute the same policy. There are 2 member states with nuclear weapons and there are member states, which are not a member of the NATO (Austria and Ireland). So, what approach?

As said, the policy area of defence has remained primarily the domain of nation states. On 18 December 2013, The German Marshall Fund posted an article by Martin Michelot, research and program officer in the Paris office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, why Europe needs to take common control on defense. It is easy to be frustrated by the pace of Europe’s progress toward a common defense strategy and the absence of urgency. Just last week, French Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault channeled feelings within French political circles when he called for “a strategy, a global vision, a global organization,” while insisting that “France isn’t asking anybody to assume its responsibilities in its place.” But Europeans finally have an opportunity to address this issue head-on at this week’s European Council meeting in Brussels.

It is clear that not all the problems that have beset European defense cooperation and the development the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) over the past few years can be solved by the Council. But the Brussels meeting marks an important opportunity to give momentum to a process that has not come naturally to member states in the past. Beyond focusing on the hard deliverables of the summit — of which there will be few — the emphasis should be on the framework that will be agreed upon to pursue these very necessary talks in the future. European diplomats have been working hard over the past few months to ensure that this will not be another missed opportunity for common defense, which would mark a setback for Europe’s global strategic relevance.

The two and a half hours of discussion on security and defense this week will focus on three different items: the effectiveness of CSDP, the improvement of Europe’s security capabilities, and support for Europe’s defense industry. One enabling element looms in the background of these discussions: it seems that Europeans have finally realized that they can no longer wait to take concrete measures in the face of the ongoing budgetary crisis. They are now ready to sit around a table and discuss these hard issues, after having for years looked for alternative solutions. The decisive driver behind any future progress will be the existence of true political will on the part of member states, and a willingness to drive the process forward, following decisions made by the Council. Whether this realization has been imposed, as in the case of many smaller countries, or by the growing understanding of Europe as an enabler of sorts, notably in the cases of France or Poland, does not matter as much as the dynamics that this new state of mind creates among the interested parties.

After the process of balancing expectations and outcomes that has played out in the last few months, it is crucial that European leaders are able to agree to a common set of objectives that they can reach in the years to come. The stakes are high, and so are the risks of strategic downgrading if Europe does not have the tools to face challenges that will present themselves in the future. Ukraine and Mali are only tastes of things to come. Of course, there are, and will always be, stumbling blocks in this process. For example, reconciling 28 strategic postures and priorities in an effort to create a new European Security Strategy is a massive task, but one that should not stop Europeans from taking measured, but firm, steps toward a deeper integration of their defense agendas, especially in terms of future procurement.

The question of the relationship between EU structures and NATO — an issue of significant concern for the United States — has been left on the sidelines for now, but will need to be addressed given the various capabilities of the interested parties. The issues surrounding Europe’s defense industry have proven equally delicate, but are also the one aspect on which the EU, via the Commission’s directives, can empower institutions such as the European Defense Agency to support industry and make it more globally competitive. This could be done, for example, through support for research and development and incentives for member states to think through their modernization processes strategically. Thinking together about European weaknesses that the United States military compensated for in Libya and Mali, such as indigenous drones or better air-to-air refueling capabilities, is an integral part of this long-term thought process.

Despite these complications, it is crucial for Europeans to create inclusive structures for discussion in order to make further progress easier, while at the same time keeping open the possibility for willing members to go a step further in broadening their defense cooperation, whether in multilateral or bilateral formats. At this point, Europe cannot afford to worry about creating a two-speed Europe on defense issues: getting the engine in gear is the first step. The current geopolitical context gives Europe all the reasons it needs to take control. It can no longer afford the luxury of remaining in the passenger seat.

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23 June 2011 was already discussed in The Netherlands in the presence of almost hundred participants from embassies, institutions, politics, universities, ngo's and public that many member-states economized expenses on their military forces, but reductions are not tuned mutual. Again a symptom of shortage of coherence between national and international defence planning. Agreement on a more coordinated restructuring of military forces is strongly needed.
As known, NATO reviewed the strategic draft in november 2010. A result from this is a compromise between old member-states who consider Russia not any more as a big threat and strive after a new NATO that is also focussed on piece missions outside agreed arrangements and new member-states who focuss on defence against possible aggression (of Russia). Although the European Union developed in 2003 a strategic draft, this draft has to be considered as preparatory, which underlines the necessity of a new strategic draft for Europe.

...From the Council on Foreign Relations
A strategy needs to have at least to define goals, to reach instruments and to provide required tools. EU's approach can be characterized as prevemtive, holistic and multilateral. That are answers on the how-questions, but not on the question on guiding goals. What to do needs a much more explicit answer. According to Sven Biscop, a strategy for Europe starts with addressing of values and vital intrests, which Europe wants to secure and carry out. That will lead to the choice of a ever deeper political union, wherein member-states bundle their sovereignty. More specific aims for three key-areas of foreign policy are advocated: neighbourhood-policy, reform of multilateral institutions and relations with other superpowers and security and defence policy. Concerning the last aim: only EU-27 together can organize the required capacities, for the member-states provide over almost 2 million troops and a budget of eur 200 milliard, but are not able to raise more than 80.000 troops.
The security approach of the EU in areas with crisis characterizes, amoung other things, through holism, a comprehensive (mixed civil and military) approach. The Lisbon Treaty paves the way for new opportunities for an effective comprehensive approach. Researched was what restrained the EU to make good use of these opportunities. Most important reason is the shortage of political unanimity on the approach of a crisis, conflict, catastrophe and war. How to intervene? With what instruments? And with what goals? There is resistance against abandoning sovereignty. But also with presence of political unanimity, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) still endures 4 shortcomings:

1. the lack of civil-military integrated strategies of crisis-areas;
2. the fragmentation of civil and military institutions;
3. divergent finance-mechanisms for civil and military operations;
4. lack of tuning between civil and military capacities.

Political level will not succeed, if pillars can not be broken, not only between external and internal security, but also between civil and military crisis-control. Fragmentation of competences, budgets and capacities can not exist longer as long as there is still talk of un-coordinated restructering of national armies. How will the EU range goals, instruments and tools for a security and defence policy?

During the gathering phenomenons as (counter)terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, piracy, failed states and organised crimes were mentioned as examples how to handle these and the paper and discussion is meant as poltical document, as a message (what does Europe want) and as basis for defence-planning. Europe should be much more active than only cooperate.

Much is happening around the EU. The US expects Europe will take more responsibility: increase of relations with NATO and African Union are part of that. But, we have to notice that not all EU-member-states are a NATO-member and vice versa, EDEO is not yet operational and that the EU is originally based on civil aspects and after that military focussed.

Working on the relationship between NATO and EU is needed. The EU is working on development of partial strategies in order to get overview. It has to be questioned what a threat is and we have to remind that the US also sometimes take part in EU-operations. Many domeins and levels within a lot of areas are mixed-up. That's why Europe needs a new strategic draft.

European Union (EU) foreign policy has long been considered the domaine réservé of the member states. but the recent study 'The influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence' shows that EU officials in the Common Security and Defence Policy are most influential in the agenda-setting phase and more influential in civilian than in military operations. This can be explained by their central position in the policy process, which allows them to get early involved in the operations.


June 23, 2011

View this newsletter as a web page on CFR's website.

Enhancing U.S. Crisis Preparedness

Dear Colleague, I am pleased to inform you that the Center for Preventive Action's first Policy Innovation Memorandum, Enhancing U.S. Crisis Preparedness," has been formally released. This memo briefly describes the challenges the United States faces in adequately preparing for, and responding to, unexpected developments like the recent “Arab Spring” uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. It also argues that the Obama administration can reduce the chances of being blindsided and unprepared in future crises by instituting a regular national security risk assessment of potential threats and challenges while also elevating the role of strategic planning to provide high level policy guidance as to how they may be managed and better still averted. "Enhancing U.S. Crisis Preparedness" is available online at  www.cfr.org/crisis_preparedness_memo.Sincerely,Dr. Paul B. StaresGeneral John W. Vessey Senior Fellow for Conflict PreventionDirector, Center for Preventive ActionCouncil on Foreign Relations1777 F Street, NWWashington, DC 20006tel 202.509.8461  fax 202.509.8490

The absence of strong control mechanisms and doctrine in civilian crisis management gives them opportunities to affect civilian missions. Finally, EU officials direct civilian operations from Brussels, whereas the command of military operations is with the member states and NATO. Europe has only one set of armed forces, and there are different requirements for military and for military-civilian missions and so a constellation of forces and facilities develops, building-up expertise but reducing flexibility. Therefore a shared approach is necessary, but this is made more difficult by the fact that some EU members are not members of NATO and that one EU member does not recognize one NATO partner (Cyprus _ Turkey).
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In cooperation with Faculty Governance and Global Affairs (formerly Campus The Hague) and the Master European Union Studies at the University of Leiden, the Montesquieu Institute organised 16 March 2011 a seminar on CSDP: EUROPEAN DEFENCE after LISBON: POSSIBILITIES of REINFORCE COOPERATION.

'You are in Brussels to negotiate with other countries, but often you spend more time negotiating with the Hague…........ I felt I had more influence on policy in the Hague in Brussels than as an advisor in the Netherlands.” Dr Hans Molenaar, policy advisor at the Ministry of Defence, with five years experience with the Dutch representation in Brussels, addressed the European seminar on the challenges posed by a common foreign and security policy on 16th March and distributed papers about 'ESDP-structures', 'EU Capability Development beyond 2010'(see below)) and Post HLG 2010' (see below). Leiden University, faculty of Humanities, the Institute for History summerized:

After an overview of the history and institutional structures of decision-making, as hanged by the Lisbon Treaty, Dr Molenaar drew on his experiences in Brussels since his arrival in 2005. When he arrived, in the aftermath of the Iraq debate the member states’ views were more polarized than they are today, but even so among the larger states the poles are still set by the French and the British. These tensions reflect not only on individual policies but also on the balance within and among institutions, particularly the UN, NATO and the EU.

The first current issue he selected was the choice of missions. Europe has only one set of armed forces, and there are different requirements for military and for military-civilian missions and so a constellation of forces and facilities develops, building-up expertise but reducing flexibility. Therefore a shared approach is necessary, but this is made more difficult by the fact that some EU members are not members of NATO and that one EU member does not recognize one NATO partner (ie Cyprus and Turkey).

Institutional stalemate is avoided by the use of informal routes for information sharing and consultation, but it is a complication Europe could do without.

A second question concerns civil-military cooperation, an activity which Europe does well because it can deploy a variety of assets and instruments that are not available to NATO. But these remain different instruments, each with its own protagonists, traditions of work and time horizons (compare peace-keeping with development assistance).

A third question is the lack of a Head-Quarters for military missions – the elephant in the room, that everyone sees but no one talks about.

Nowadays, the EU wither shares with NATO or activated national HQs. There was an operations centre set up in 2004 for civilian-military missions but it has never been used. There is a centre for civilian missions, but nothing for military missions and, although opinion is shifting in favour of creating one, the development is still being resisted by the UK.

For the final part of his talk, Dr Molenaar described his own experience in Brussels. Whilst negotiating in Brussels, you not only represent Dutch policy, but you are well placed to assess the range of feasible options, and to advise accordingly. You can advise accordingly, and often that advice is accepted. But sometimes you have to push a policy to the point of failure before the policy (then) shifts. He then addressed a case study describing Benelux influence in shaping the agreed EU Capability Development beyond 2010, where a Benelux proposal had been largely been incorporated into the final text. From that case study he drew eight lessons for ‘Europe in practice’:

  • you must know what you want very early, the earlier the better

  • it is important to maintain expertise and continuity, to help predict reactions and therefore become more effective

  • you need to know the balance of discussion and how to follow through

  • you must be able to see not only what you want, but also the needs of your opponents (and, if possible, you need to be able to anticipate them)

  • you occasionally need some good luck and always need the right circumstances

  • you need to be consistent and to make sure that the message come across in the same form from all sources

  • you need to be aware of the law of unintended circumstances – when a policy choice will have implications in other areas – and, again, anticipate them

  • you need to work between the lines of decision-making – it is in, and around, committees that products are agreed upon.

  • The talk generated many questions and even heated debate among the audience, a fitting testament to the content and the clarity of the talk and to the importance of the issues addressed. All of us were aware that as we were listening, the UN was discussing the no-fly issue over Libya following the failure of the EU, NATO and G8 to agree.

ESDP-structures

........European Council

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Council on Public Affairs
..and External Relations

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Political and Security Committee 

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Political Military Group
European Council
 

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EU Militair Committee

Committe for Civil Aspects
of Crisis Management

EU lezing Arnout Molenaar


EU Capability Development beyond 2010

  1. The world is changing and Europe faces an increasingly complex and uncertain security environment. There is a growing demand for the European Union to become more capable, more coherent and more strategic as a global actor. The EU disposes of a unique array of instruments to help promote peace and security where needeed.

  2. A comprehensive approach is a key asset to tackle the complex, multi-actor and multi-dimensional crises and growing security threats of today and tomorrow, as highlighted in the European Security Strategy and the Report on its implementation. The Council agrees that in addition to continuing with civilian missions and military operations, the EU has to improve its ability to foster civilian-military cooperation and to use CSDP as part of coherent EU action, which should also include political, diplomatic, legal, development, trade and economic instruments.

  3. The Treaty of Lisbon offers an opportunity for reinforcing the comprehensive approach. As the European External Action Service becomes operational under the direction of the High Representative, who is also Vice President of the Commission, the Treaty's implementation will facilitate and maximize effectiveness of the use of the variety of policies and instruments at the EU's disposal in a more coherent manner, in order to address the whole cycle, from preparedness and preventative action; through crisis response and management, including stabilisation, peace-making and peace-keeping; to peace-building, recovery, reconstruction and a return to longer-term development.

  4. In this context, the Council remains fully committed to the comprehensive civil-military level of ambition of 2008, as set out in the Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities, inter alia in the framework of deploying 60000 troops within 60 days for a major operation , to be able to plan and conduct simultaneously a series of operations and missions, of varying scope:

a

two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations, with a suitable civilian component, supported by up to 10 000 troops for at least two years

b

two rapid-response operations of limited duration using inter alia EU battle groups

c

an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals (in less than ten days), bearing in mind the primary role of each Member State as regards its nationals and making use of the consular lead State concept

d

a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission

e

a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days

f

around a dozen CSDP civilian missions (inter alia police, rule-of-law, civilian administration, civil protection, security sector reform, and observation missions) of varying formats, including in rapid-response situations, together with a major mission (possibly up to 3000 experts) which could last several years.

  1. With this level of amvition in view, the Council welcomes the progress made by the Member States to strengthen their civilian and military capabilities respectively, and will continue to address as a matter of priority the shortfalls that persist. To this end, the Council extends the implementation of the respective existing civilian and military Headline Goals beyond 2010. The Council calls for enhanced efforts at EU level and by Member States to continue to make their assets available to CSDP missions and operations and to make all efforts to meet these capability requirements. A comprehensive approach to international security also requires comprehensiveness in capability development. Notwithstanding the need to respect the specificities of civilian and military capability development, this should lead to greater coherence, and in the longer term, to streamlining both processes wherever feasible and necessary.

  2. Emphasising that the current financial climate and budgetary constraints reinforce the case for more cooperation and transparent exchange of information, the Council is determined to reinvigorate existing processes and instruments to help Member States to strengthen capabilities and to foster cooperation. In the field of defence cooperation, the Council will further exploit innovative methods for collaboration, such as pooling, sharing and role specialisation, and build upon examples of bilateral and multinational cooperation in Europe.

17208/10 PL/ig 2 and 3. LIMITE EN, CMPD

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Post HLG 2010

The continued uncertain security environment combined with limited financial resources impel us to focus on the delivery of civilian and military capabilities, as well as on the instruments to guide Member States in their efforts and to foster cooperation between them.

Capabilities underpin effective foreign and security policy and the EU's aim to become more capable, more coherent and more strategic as a global actor. At this point, not higher levels of ambition, but capabilities that better match CSDP needs and effective ways to use them in its operations and missions are the priority.

The ESDP Declaration of december 2008, describing the Union's most likely missions and operations, contains an overlapping civil-military level of amibition, set within the respective Headline Goals.

The civilian and military requirements, as elaborated under the respective Headline Goals 2010, remain valid as they were developed to enable the EU to effctively undertake all its tasks across the spectrum of conflict prevention and crisis management, and important shortfalls still remains. These requirements should continue to be the practible elaboration of the EU's civilian and military levels of ambition.

New threats identified under the ESS evaluation of 2008, such as climate change and energy security as well as piracy, do not warrant a reopening of the ongoing capability processes. However, the responses to crisis emanating from such factors will have to be taken into account, including when developing options for a maritime security strategy.

Against this backround, the political strategic document that was suggested during PSC's initial discussion on 21 May on the future of the Headline Goals 2010 should:

1

take the EU's comprehensive approach as its starting point and outline some key considerations against the backround of the set-up of the EEAS

2

provide a qualitative judgment on the progress achieved so far in the implementation of the Headline Goals 2010 and the Capability Development Plan of the EDA

3

address the need to improve capabilities for civilian missions, which are increasingly deployed in difficult operational circumstances, complex environments and short timelines, including by promoting a systematic approach on training mission personnel

4

renew the commitment to improve the quality of Member States' military capabilities, i.e. in the areas of (rapid) deployability, sustainability, protection, and interoperability

5

reinforce the link between capability development and armaments cooperation and renew the commitment to look for cooperation, pooling and sharing and other collaborative solutions, including by exploiting tyhe possibilities that the Treaty of Lisbon and the EDA offers

6

report on the progress made in pursuing synergies between civilian and military capability development, in synergy with the Commission, including on how to make best use of dual-use capabilities

7

take account of the link between internal and external security and propose areas of cooperation between CSDP and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), in particular on their operational interconnectedness

8

address the increasing importance of the EU's role in promoting good governance in the security sector and enabling bilateral and regional actors, in particular the African Union, to become more effective in the area of crisis management

9

recall our commitment for cooperation with NATO on military capability development, with a view to increase coherence, mutual reinforcement and cost-effectiveness, and in that context take work forward on concrete capability areas, and purse other possibilities on the basis of experiences gained

10

propose more coherent and more political reporting on issues of capability development for Ministers' consideration in the Council, to raise awareness and visibility

11

keep open the option of revisiting the current Headline Goals in due course based on these progress reports, including the possibility of joining the civilian and military Headline Goals in a single document, while keeping the related civilian and military processes separate

The Foreign Affairs Council should adopt these suggested strategic guidelines for reinvigorated EU capability development by the end of 2010, subsequently to be endorsed by the European Council, to provide additional guidance for capability development under the current Headline Goals, taking account of the progress achieved so far.This should help Member States to maintain and continue developing Europe's crisis management capabilities in a time of financial austerity.

BENELUX, June 2010

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TOWARDS an INTERNAL (IN)SECURITY STRATEGY for the EU?
(CEPS about liberty and security in Europe)
The European Commission published in November 2010 a Communication aiming at putting the EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS) into action. The Communication envisages five key strategic objectives for the EU’s internal security: disrupt organised crime, prevent terrorism, raise levels of security in cyberspace, strengthen external borders management and increase the EU’s resilience to natural disasters.

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Jaap de Hoop Scheffer about the EU and the NATO


On 21 April 2010, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer delivered a lecture about the
EU and the NATO, organised by The Montesquieu Institute in cooperation with Campus The Hague and the Master European Union Studies at the University of Leiden.
In another era in world politics, it was relativly simple to manage affairs and interest. Now Europe (the EU) needs strong institutions and more intergovermental acting. Several powers are on the rise. China is looking for bases due to piracy on sea, India is at work for aircraft carriers for the navy, Brazil ..... However, for the time being, the US will stay most influential through its economic, political and militairy power. Nowadays we have to realize that weapons of mass destruction could become a great risk if in wrong hands. Climate change has its security dimension and is a serious danger for the future, there is energy security.

The EU and the political military transatlantic focussing organisation NATO, have overlaps. It is important to keep dialogue alive between Europe and the US and it is important that Europe has to act together to get approached seriously.

There is no direct enemy since the collapse of the Sovjet Union. But Georgia and Oekraine are in front, thinking of the influence that Russia wants to execute. NATO and EU are a very big dilemma. Nevertheless several times a year there is an informal dinner with foreign ministers of the EU-member states. Questioned is what is the meaning of the NATO Treaty? In a way Russia is a partner, but an extremely difficult one to develop a foreign policy with. Operations in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan are new for the NATO and the EU. Neither the NATO, nor the EU can give all the answers. The EU is rather succesful with its soft power, but can do more. In Iraq, Kosovo and Darfur there are operations concerning training.

How difficult it is to achieve results an example was given about human rights, particular about the 18 year old boy who downloaded from the internet. He was arrested and sentenced to death. After talks the punishment changed. Now the boy is safe, somewhere on another continent.
Another item is the Cyprus situation. Caused by head of states there is a north and south part. For years NATO and the EU are executing relationship to recover the situation as much as possible. NATO, the EU, OECD grew big. Together with climate change and energy security, challenges have become much more complicated then before. Strong institutions are needed.
Montesquieu Institute
Looking to Greece and the euro, Germany pushed decisions and not the European Commission. Heads of states are excercising their influence more and more. NATO needs to manage and to restructure its finance, otherwise operations could not survive. The EU should take its own responsibility. Not through an imperial role, but through a solid foreign policy, covered by the foreign ministers of EU member states. Note that the UK and France have always an alternative in world politics.

Finally: 'Lisbon' has given Europe structure.

(*) The Montesquieu Institute for the study of comparative European parliamentary history and constitutional development. The Institute is a multifunctional centre for comparative studies, education, dialogue and debate. It supports those involved in fostering and strengthening democracy. It aims at serving students and specific target groups such as parliamentarians and other politicians, civil servants, educators, journalists and those employed by interest groups
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The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was set up in 1996
.

CTBT movie


It is an interim organization tasked with building up the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in preparation for the Treaty's entry into force as well as promoting the Treaty's universality.


A seminar 24 September 2008, organised by NGIZ,
CFSP and Institute Clingendael. Common Foreign Security Policy, who is supervising CFSP? What about military cooperation?
Consequences concerning individual files stays out of sight. How about European defence cooperation in future? Is more delay expected concerning Lisbon-agreements? State of affairs about security and defense-concept of the EU: The 'no' looks not really a problem. EU-Presidencies are used to improve defence strategy. Defence is more focussed outside Europe. (Within Europe it is hardly unthinkable that we will make war. Developed and existing structures exclude such a situation).

Two important and actual documents are: A
speech to Presse Club and AmCham about strengthening global security for Europe and 'Re-energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy'. As the result of the Elysée Treaty signed on January 22nd, 1963 by the French President, Général de Gaulle, and the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer the creation of Eurocorps can be considered. In this treaty aiming at strengthening the French-German relationship both countries committed themselves to cooperate in the field of defence.

Apart from a closer political relationship, both countries planned personnel exchanges between their respective armed forces and cooperation in the field of defence industry. In 1987, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl decided to intensify the military cooperation between France and Germany: they announced the setup of the French-German Security and Defence Council that allowed the creation of the French-German Brigade, operational since 1991. On October 14th, 1991, both heads of state and government informed the chairman of the Council of Europe, in a common letter, of their intention to reinforce this military cooperation. Thus they laid the foundations of a European army corps in which the other WEU members could participate. On the occasion of the La Rochelle summit on May 22nd, 1992, François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl took the official decision of creating the Eurocorps, simultaneously with the adoption of the common report of the French and German Defence Ministers. A few weeks later, as early as July 1st, a temporary staff installed itself in Strasbourg in order to set up the Eurocorps staff.

The Petersberg Declaration dated June 19th, 1992 defines the WEU's role as a EU defence component (Petersberg missions *). Based on this orientation, the Eurocorps Member States decided on May 19th, 1993 in Rome to put the Eurocorps at the WEU's disposal. On January 21st, 1993, the SACEUR Agreement defined the Eurocorps' conditions of employment in a NATO framework. This agreement points out:
· the Eurocorps' missions in a NATO framework,
· the competences for planning commitments,
· the Eurocorps' assignment under a NATO command-in-chief, the responsibilities of and the relationship between the NATO Commander-in-Chief and the Eurocorps Commander in peacetime
*) The Petersberg tasks cover a great range of possible military missions, ranging from the most simple to the most robust military intervention. They are formulated as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Officially, the range of tasks the EU commits itself to "includes" the above, but is not limited to them. In practice, the task of territorial defence is considered the domain of NATO. As many European countries are fervent supporters of NATO, there are many provisions to prevent competition with NATO