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THE SPECTRE OF A MULTIPOLAR EUROPE

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with Dimitar Bechev, Jana Kobzova
& Andrew Wilson

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Executive summary

The European Union has spent much of the last decade defending a European order that no longer functions, while hoping for a global order that will probably never come. It is true that war between major powers is unlikely, but EU governments know that the existing security institutions were unable to prevent the Kosovo crisis in 1998-99, to slow the arms race in the Caucasus, to prevent cuts to the EU's gas supply in 2008, prevent the Russo-Georgian war or arrest instability in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 – let alone make headway in resolving the continent's other so-called frozen conflicts.

The EU's 'unipolar moment' is over. In the 1990s, the EU's grand hope was that American hard power would underpin the spread of European soft power and the integration of all Europe's powers into a liberal order – embodied in NATO and the EU – in which the rule of law, pooled sovereignty and interdependence would gradually replace military conflict, the balance of power and spheres of influence. However, the prospects for this unipolar multilateral European order are fading.

Europeans were quick to hail the rise of a multipolar world, but much slower to spot the parallel emergence of different poles within their own continent. Russia, which was never comfortable with NATO or EU enlargement, is now powerful enough to openly call for new European security architecture. Turkey, frustrated by the short-sighted way some EU member states have blocked accession negotiations, still wants to join the EU but is increasingly pursuing an independent foreign policy and looking for a larger role; unless EU member states show good faith by opening new chapters, this trend will only be strengthened. Meanwhile the United States – which has its hands full dealing with Afghanistan, Iran and the rise of China – has ceased to be a full-time European power.

However, the EU has spent much of the last decade defending a system that its own governments realise is dysfunctional. Although they are aware of rising instability, member states have still attempted to preserve the status quo. This explains the largely tactical response of the EU to President Dmitry Medvedev's June 2008 proposal. But by taking such a passive approach, EU leaders have actually made a multipolar Europe more likely. Because it is almost impossible to work *through* the formal institutions, the continent's three major powers – the EU, Russia and Turkey – are increasingly working *around* them. For example, some EU member states recognized the independence of Kosovo despite Russian opposition; Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia despite EU opposition; and Turkey cooperated with Brazil in formulating a response to Iran's nuclear threat without consulting NATO. This risks recreating de facto spheres of influence in Europe. In short, European leaders, by defending an illusion of order, are in danger of making disorder a reality.

However, while it is Russia and Turkey that complain about the status quo, it is the EU that has the most to lose in the current state of peaceful disorder. The EU therefore has a particular interest in engaging in a genuine discussion on the fundamental nature and the institutions of the future European order. It needs a new strategic approach that is not about preventing war between Europe's powers but helping them live together in peace. It should stop thinking of Europe's history over these twenty years as the development of a single project centred on the EU and NATO and instead understand it as the story of four parallel identity-building projects – all of which are in different ways young, weak and vulnerable: the post-national EU, the post-imperial Russia, the post-Kemalist Turkey and the newly sovereign states on the territory of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia.

In order to enhance the security of Europe, EU member states should build on the positive momentum of America's reset diplomacy and Russia's new *Westpolitik* by supporting Russia's inclusion in the US-initiated common missile defence shield. However, EU member states should themselves take the lead on guaranteeing security in Europe. The EU should therefore go beyond its policy of defensive engagement with Russia through the OSCE. Instead of an anachronistic 'concert of powers', the EU should aim to develop a 'concert of projects' – a way of breathing life into multilateral arrangements for discussing and managing the continent's security in the interests of all.

- 2 The EU should be open to the creation of new treaties and institutions, but should stress that such treaties should be signed and such institutions built

from the bottom up rather than the top down. We believe that the best way for the EU to achieve these goals is through initiating an informal security triologue between the EU, Turkey and Russia. It should be based on three elements:

- A European security triologue. Rather than setting up a new institution, the EU should call for the creation of a regular informal European security triologue that would build on the Merkel-Medvedev idea of an EU-Russia security dialogue but expand it to include Turkey. The triologue – which would bring together Europe’s major security powers in the same way that the G20 convenes the world’s economic ones – could meet regularly to discuss the major security issues in our continent and the overlapping neighbourhoods of its central players.
- A European security action plan. The first task of the triologue should be to elaborate an action plan for reducing tensions on the European continent. This could include a number of goals, including reducing the threat of destabilization of Europe’s periphery by demilitarization of the most volatile regions and solving frozen conflicts that remain the major source of insecurity. The solution of these frozen conflicts should be made a pre-condition for signing any new treaty.
- A European security treaty. EU leaders are right to be suspicious about the benefits of negotiating a treaty before Russia has shown itself willing to make progress on the many pressing security challenges on the European continent. However, EU member states would also have much to gain from a new treaty – if, that is, it comes at the end of a process of confidence-building. If the EU were a signatory to such a treaty, it would be institutionalised as a key security actor in Europe and enabled to use the range of tools it has at its disposal to deal with the threats its member states face.

The approach to European security we propose would be good for the EU because it would recognise its role as a central anchor for security on the European continent, thus providing a powerful impetus for a genuine strategic debate among member states about what kind of order the EU should be promoting. By institutionalising the EU’s role in the European security triologue, EU member states could end the anomaly that the EU – a major supplier of European security – is not represented in any of our continent’s security institutions. This

is both a natural move towards implementing the Lisbon Treaty and a response to a shift in EU security preoccupations. The EU is best placed to deal with the threats on which EU security elites increasingly focus, as a survey carried out for this research shows.

Russia, meanwhile, would see the EU's engagement with the new security architecture as recognition of its relevance as a European power at a moment that the European continent as a whole risks being marginalised. The trilogue would also recognise Turkey's role as a rising power and begin to provide an anchor for its foreign policy activism at a very risky moment when Turkey is losing confidence in the sincerity of the accession process. Accession negotiations with Turkey would continue to take place alongside the trilogue and it would make sense to use its establishment as an occasion to open chapters on energy security and CSDP. When Turkey becomes a member of the EU, the trilogue would simply become a dialogue between the EU and Russia. This trilateral approach could also be attractive for the newly independent states in Europe's periphery because it would create new mechanisms for addressing some of the existential challenges that they face, such as frozen conflicts and energy disputes.

The dilemma facing the European Union in its own continent is somewhat similar to that faced by the US at a global level. The EU can do little to prevent Europe's evolution from a unipolar to a multipolar order; but it can do a lot to shape the relations between its emerging poles. The new approach would take advantage of a political opening created by Moscow's desire to modernise and Turkey's search for a regional role, and recast the continent's institutional order for a world in which Europe is increasingly peripheral and in which a weak neighbour can be as frightening as a strong one. It would be the first step towards creating a trilateral rather than a tripolar Europe: a new institutional order in the continent that (to paraphrase Lord Ismay) keeps the EU united, Russia post-imperial and Turkey European.

Introduction: The illusion of order

The European Union has spent much of the last decade defending a European order that no longer functions while hoping for a global order that will probably never come. As a result, the European continent is less stable than we thought it had become, while the EU is less influential than we hoped it would be. Two events in 2008 exposed this uncomfortable reality: the Russia-Georgia war raised anew the spectre of great-power rivalry on the old continent, while the financial crisis revealed the fragility and interdependence of European economies and societies.

At the same time, two of Europe's three key security actors are increasingly questioning either the legitimacy of the existing order or their role within it. Russia, which was never comfortable with NATO or EU enlargement, is now powerful enough to openly call for a new European security architecture. Turkey, frustrated by the short-sighted way some EU member states have blocked accession negotiations, still wants to join the EU but is increasingly pursuing an independent foreign policy and looking for a larger role; unless EU member states show good faith by opening new chapters, this trend will only be strengthened. These shifts are taking place in a global context in which Europe is losing its centrality in international politics. As new sovereignty-minded global centres of power such as China challenge Europe's multilateral vision, the United States' interest in Europe is dramatically declining.

The central paradox of the EU's security strategy is that it is defending a system that its own governments realise is dysfunctional. It is true that war between major powers is unlikely. But EU governments know that the existing security institutions were unable to prevent the Kosovo crisis in 1998-99, to slow the arms race in the Caucasus, to prevent cuts to the EU's gas supply in 2008 or arrest instability in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, let alone make headway in resolving the continent's other so-called frozen conflicts. They are aware of rising instability

on the continent's periphery; yet they fear that any attempt to renegotiate the European security order could hurt the EU's interests by further undermining an institutional order left over from the Cold War.

This explains the largely tactical response by the EU to President Dmitry Medvedev's proposal in June 2008 of a new security treaty for Europe. Unwilling to kill the initiative, the EU instead condemned it to be discussed in the framework of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) so-called Corfu process – a forum described by one senior European politician at an ECFR event as “a *perpetuum mobile* that will go on forever without reaching a conclusion”.¹

In adopting such an approach, EU leaders are failing to advance the vision of the 1990s: namely, that the West's overwhelming power could be used to build a multilateral Europe governed by the institutional norms that developed out of the Helsinki accords of 1975. Rather, they are actually contributing to the emergence of a multipolar Europe in which there are no effective institutions to constrain competition between the major powers. In short, European leaders, by defending an illusion of order, are in danger of making disorder a reality.

The practical impossibility of working *through* the formal institutions is reflected in the way that the continent's three major powers – the EU, Russia and Turkey – are increasingly working *around* them. For example, some EU member states recognized the independence of Kosovo despite Russian opposition; Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia despite EU opposition; and Turkey cooperated with Brazil in formulating a response to Iran's nuclear threat without consulting NATO. This risks recreating de facto spheres of influence in Europe. But the root of the problem is less the policies pursued by states than an institutional deadlock that has ceased to provide Europeans with stability and instead become a source of instability – encouraging Russia's revisionism, increasing Turkey's alienation from the West, raising the risk of failed states on Europe's periphery, and creating incentives for a renationalisation of EU foreign and security policy.

For most of the second half of the twentieth century, western European governments and publics relied for their security on the nation states and on

The Medvedev proposal

Russia first called for a new legally binding security treaty “for the whole Euro-Atlantic space from Vancouver to Vladivostok” during a speech by President Dmitry Medvedev to German leaders in Berlin in June 2008. Medvedev argued that continental security had degenerated in recent years, while post-Cold War institutions had become too dysfunctional to fix it; warned his Berlin audience against “marginalizing and isolating countries, creating zones with differentiated levels of security;” and concluded that a “European Security Treaty” was now necessary.

Medvedev expanded on his proposal during a speech in Evian in October 2008. He announced that members of NATO, the EU, the OSCE and China would all be invited to a major summit in Moscow to discuss a pact; Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov compared the proposal to the 30-nation Helsinki treaty of 1975 that improved relations between Cold War rivals by saying that the new agreement “should be a kind of Helsinki-2.”

Russia published a treaty-draft in December 2009. Moscow’s vision focuses exclusively on hard security; the pact it seeks would enshrine sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs, with the use of force requiring the consent of all signatories. Medvedev has continued to call for such a pan-European treaty, most recently at the Yaroslavl conference in September 2010.

The OSCE has begun to discuss the new security architecture for Europe within the framework of the so-called Corfu process, which was launched in June 2009. Under Kazakhstan’s chairmanship, representatives of the OSCE’s member states will convene for a summit in Astana on 1-2 December 2010 to identify the strategic areas of work needed to strengthen the European security architecture.

NATO. The alliance will continue to play a key role in preventing war between European states and protecting them from external threats – in short, defending the security of Europe. EU governments have therefore benefited from Obama’s reset diplomacy, which will have positive implications for NATO and its ability to renew its relationship with Russia. However, EU member states now need to flank this with their own initiative to tackle the tensions between European states that are not at the top of the agenda of NATO or the US. These challenges to European stability, from frozen conflicts to gas cut-offs, lie at the intersection between domestic and foreign policy – in short, they are about security *in* Europe.

Paradoxically, although Russia and Turkey complain about the current institutions, it is the EU that has the most to gain from re-energising the institutions of European security. While Turkey and Russia still show a degree of attachment to traditional ideas of sovereignty and the use of military power, EU member states have chosen to rely on the rule of law and multilateral cooperation as the primary means to defend their security. The perpetuation of the status quo means that EU member states are squandering the opportunity to formalise the EU – with all its tools of soft and hard power – as a security actor in its own right. With the new position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU is for the first time institutionally capable of becoming Europe’s primary security actor.

Why have EU member states taken so long to face up to the instability of the status quo? In part it is because they have been paralysed by three intractable debates that grew out of the post-Cold War settlement: whether to engage with or contain Russia; whether or not to allow Turkey to join the EU; and whether the EU’s embryonic security identity would undermine NATO. EU member states remain as divided as ever about these three issues, but the world will not wait for the EU to resolve them. Yet new developments are afoot which could allow EU nations to make progress in spite of these bitter divisions. In Russia there is a debate about engaging with the West that could give the EU fresh sources of leverage. Turkey’s growing foreign-policy ambitions could make it a key partner for the EU on security issues if only member states could find a new way of engaging with Ankara in parallel with accession negotiations. And the US, by ending its opposition to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and signalling its desire to revert to a role as offshore balancer, could present the EU with opportunities for confident, unified action.

10 In this context, we believe it is in the interests of EU member states to launch their own vision for a future European order. Instead of simply looking for a

way to shelve Medvedev's proposal without alienating Russia, EU member states should take advantage of the opportunity provided by it to rethink Europe's security future. This does not mean that EU member states should simply accept Medvedev's idea for a new security treaty. Rather, they should have a debate amongst themselves at the European Council, develop a positive conception of what kind of security order the EU as a whole needs, and use the negotiations of European order as a vehicle for establishing the EU as a major security actor.

In light of these considerations, we argue in the following chapters that:

- the best way to prevent the emergence of a multipolar Europe based on spheres of influence as an unintended consequence of the dysfunctionality of the existing institutions is to engage in a discussion about Europe's security architecture
- there is a surprising convergence among EU member states about threat perceptions, which creates a chance to start genuine negotiations on the future security architecture of the continent using the opportunity provided by Medvedev's proposal
- Russia's post-crisis *Westpolitik* represents a tactical shift in Russian foreign policy which gives the EU a window of opportunity to test out Moscow's willingness to play a more constructive role in the neighbourhood and create structures that could make it last longer
- in order to strengthen Turkey's European identity – and harness Turkish soft and hard power in its neighbourhood – the EU should offer Ankara a top-table seat in a new European security dispensation in parallel with enhanced accession negotiations
- the EU should therefore build on the Merkel-Medvedev idea of an EU-Russia security dialogue and, by including Turkey, create an informal security triad that includes the three major powers in the European space
- the US, which for half a century was the single most important security factor in Europe, will continue to provide a guarantee against the recurrence of major war in the continent; but increasingly it expects Europe to address other security threats on its own.

We will show in this report how Europeans need to change a lot of their assumptions about their own security order. In our view, this order cannot be based any longer on the premise that one day all European countries will be EU or NATO members; nor, however, should it involve a return to the 19th century ‘Concert of Europe’. Rather, we should recognise the reality that the classical European nation state has been radically transformed. Four mutually dependent, and still vulnerable, state- and identity-building projects now shape Europe’s security landscape: the EU, Russia, Turkey and the new states created out of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. The only possible way to create a new security order in Europe is to bring all four into a common frame – a ‘concert of projects’. Its creation would:

- enhance the effectiveness of the EU
- consolidate Russia’s post-imperial identity in its current borders
- encourage Turkey’s post-Kemalist ambition to be a regional power but integrate it into a common framework
- stimulate the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU, and build functioning states on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Chapter 1:

A multipolar Europe in a multipolar world

In the modern era, great wars have left relations between states in ruins. The aftermath of these upheavals has often been dominated by efforts by the leaders of the major powers to put the pieces back together in order to create a new international order. Such post-war settlements have, according to John Ikenberry, tended to focus on three issues: territorial and economic restitution; the integration of the defeated states; and the creation of new rules and institutions.²

The order that emerged after the Cold War was, however, an exception to this pattern. Although two dozen new states emerged in this period, territorial questions were never at the top of the agenda; the question of integrating defeated states did not arise because no state officially lost this conflict over ideology; and no new institutions were created. Mikhail Gorbachev's vision of a "common European home" that would bury both NATO and the Warsaw Pact in a common European grave ended along with the USSR. From then on, the new European order would be embodied simply in the spread of liberal values and the enlargement of western, Cold War-era institutions. The unification of Germany became the model for the unification of Europe.

In the 1990s, such an outcome seemed a natural result of the end of the Cold War. This was the EU's 'unipolar moment': the grand hope was that American hard power would underpin the spread of European soft power and the integration of all the regional powers into a liberal order in which the rule of law, pooled sovereignty and interdependence would gradually replace military conflict, the balance of power and spheres of influence.

² G. John Ikenberry, "Political Structures and Postwar Settlements," in Samuel F. Wells and Paula Bailey Smith, eds., *European Order, 1919 and 1991* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, The Smithsonian Institution, 1996).

Robert Cooper summarises Europe's consensus as follows: "What came to an end in 1989 was not just the Cold War or even the Second World War. What came to an end in Europe (but perhaps only in Europe) were the political systems of three centuries: the balance of power and the imperial urge."³ This European vision for exporting peace and security was based on the idea of sharing values and institutions – what might be called the 'democratic enlargement' paradigm. European policymakers implicitly universalised the experience of the successful integration of central Europe into NATO and the EU, and saw enlargement as the only way to guarantee security and prosperity on the old continent. They believed that Russia should be integrated into the new European order by intrusive inspections and active monitoring based on the terms and principles of the Council of Europe, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the OSCE.

This approach was based on an assumption that Russia was a 'modern' state that had accepted the 'post-modern' imperatives of openness and interdependence. In this vision of a unipolar Europe, Turkey – the EU's Cold War ally and its longest aspirant to membership – was taken for granted. European policymakers agreed that Turkey would one day join the EU, but could not agree on when this day would come.

The end of the unipolar Europe

Europeans were quick to hail the rise of a multipolar world but much slower to spot the parallel emergence of a multipolar Europe. There is still no consensus about when exactly the post-1989 European order lost its legitimacy; but it is now clear that, during the last decade, the EU's hopes for a multilateral order for a unipolar Europe have faded.

In order to understand how this came about, we need to stop thinking of Europe's history over these twenty years as the development of a single project centred on the EU and NATO and instead understand it as the story of four parallel identity-building projects – all of which are in different ways young, weak and vulnerable. The two best-developed poles of the multipolar Europe are the EU and Russia. But the myopia of EU leaders could see Turkey become

a third independent pole. The fourth project exists in the places in-between – in other words, the newly sovereign states on the territory of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. From this perspective, the attempt to create a single multilateral European order has failed because each of the four projects represents a challenge to it.

A brief outline of the character of these four projects illustrates this point. First, the EU's internal project is based on the idea of security through pooled sovereignty. It has rejected the use of force as an instrument for settling conflicts and deliberately promoted mutual dependence between European states. At the turn of the century, many EU governments signed up to the idea of cementing Europe's security order through successive waves of NATO and EU enlargement that would extend the model to the rest of the continent. But during the last decade, many EU governments have failed to show leadership and have bowed to the growing opposition to enlargement on economic, social and cultural grounds. At the same time, enthusiasm for inviting former Soviet states such as Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO has declined, particularly since the Russia-Georgia war, because many EU member states worry that enlarging NATO will cause unnecessary tension with Russia.⁴

Second, Russia's post-imperial project is, by contrast with Europe's, best understood as that of building a 'state nation' – a state that mobilizes the nation to act on behalf of the state. Russian elites have striven to create a hard-shell state that can be integrated into the global economy but at the same time protect its internal politics from external influences. Russia never really reconciled herself with the idea of a NATO-centred and EU-centric European order. During the 1990s, President Yeltsin tolerated – rather than accepted – the expansion of the West because he hoped that by doing so Russia could become part of Europe and preserve its great-power status and influence in the post-Soviet space. In any case, Russia was too weak at the time to reverse the process. However, this pragmatic consensus came to an end with NATO's military intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Since then, Russia has become an increasingly revisionist power. It has blocked EU and US initiatives, hollowed out the activities of shared institutions from the OSCE to the United Nations, and in 2007 even declared it no longer felt bound by the CFE.

⁴ See e.g. Charles A. Kupchan, "NATO's Final Frontier", *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2010.

Third, Turkey's post-Kemalist project is about building an EU-oriented 'Muslim democracy' with its own independent foreign policy. Turkey's emergence as a regional power has come about as a result of a successful process of democratisation and liberalisation. However, this process has paradoxically also led to a de-Westernization of Turkey's political identity and secured a new place for religion in Turkey's previously secular domestic and foreign policy. Turkey is outgrowing the role it played during the first post-Cold War decade when it sublimated its grand strategy to its dual identity as a member of NATO and a candidate for accession to the EU. Although Turkey remains a democratic western ally and a committed candidate for EU membership, it is increasingly trading its place as a second-class member of the Western club for a quest to become a regional power with a global voice.

Fourth, the project of building the newly independent nations lies in the grey zone between these three emerging poles. Europe likes to think of itself as a stable continent, but in fact more states have been created and destroyed there in the two decades since 1989 than in any region at any time – other than in Africa during the decolonisation era of the 1960s. A total of fifteen new states emerged from the Soviet Union, seven from Yugoslavia and two from Czechoslovakia; in addition, there are four 'unrecognised states', and yet others that would like to join them. The violence in the Balkans has substantially receded since the 1990s, but many of the new states remain prone to crises and instability; threatened by weak statehood (whose ingredients include corruption, the ruling elites' lack of legitimacy, secessionist conflicts and ethnic hotspots); and subject to pressure from both the global economic crisis and possible external intervention. While the Balkan countries still aspire to join the EU, the post-Soviet states are not transforming their political and economic systems to meet EU standards. Instead, many seek a balancing-point between East and West in order to consolidate their own sovereignty – a strategy that can be described as 'neo-Titoism'. Perhaps the best example is Ukraine, which has oscillated between democratic reform and an attempt to play the EU off against Russia.

The dynamics of these four projects have become even more important as a result of an important shift in the attitude of the US - Europe's unspoken fourth great power. During the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War period, the US was a full-time European power. In the last few years, however, it has signalled a desire to revert to its role as an offshore balancer in Europe. It is maintaining its Article V commitments, but its interest in the old continent is dramatically decreasing as it shifts its focus towards rising powers elsewhere around the world. This has huge implications for the EU, Turkey and Russia. The US wants allies who are ready to

Turkey and the EU

Turkey applied for membership of the European Community on 14 April 1987, having concluded an association agreement back in September 1963. Though a customs union came into effect at the very end of 1995, it was only at the historic Helsinki Summit on 12 December 1999 that the EU recognised Turkey as a candidate country. Waves of democratic reforms and robust growth after the slump in 2000–2001 paved the way to the opening of membership negotiations on 3 October 2005.

However, the talks have not progressed smoothly. Only 13 chapters of 35 in total have been opened and only one (Science and Research) has been closed. 14 more chapters have been ‘frozen’, either by the EU Council or unilaterally by Cyprus, over non-compliance with the so-called Ankara Protocol of July 2005 that would open Turkish ports and airports to Greek Cypriot trade. France, which argues along with Germany and several other member states that Turkey should be granted a ‘privileged partnership’, is also blocking the chapters on Economic and Monetary Union, Regional Policy, Agriculture, Financial and Budgetary Provisions and Institutions as directly linked to membership.

Other EU members such as the UK, Italy, Spain, Finland and Sweden firmly back Turkey’s accession. According to the German Marshall Fund, public support for EU membership inside Turkey has dropped precipitously from 73% in 2004 to 41% in 2010. Only 23 per cent of EU citizens are now in favour of Turkish accession, down from 29 per cent in 2004. In June 2010, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates blamed “some in Europe” for pushing Turkey eastwards.

act outside Europe – for example in Afghanistan – and has neither the time, the patience nor the resources to create order in a continent that they do not view as a problem. Increasingly, the US expects Europe to take care of itself.

The runaway neighbourhood

Europe's emerging multipolarity is – like the world's – asymmetrical. There are major disparities and differences among the three emerging poles that are increasingly in competition with each other. The EU is the world's biggest market and an economic superpower, leaving both Russia and Turkey in its wake; Russia is a nuclear superpower, whereas Turkey and all but two EU member states do not possess nuclear weapons. While Russia is an independent power, Turkey is a member of NATO and a candidate for the EU. What qualifies it as an emerging pole in Europe in our view is not the size of its population or economy (although both are expected to grow dramatically in the next decades – see table below) but its critical role in shaping the security identity of Europe and its growing influence in Europe's periphery. As two EU foreign ministers recently acknowledged, Turkey is “already an important force and an influential actor with considerable ‘soft power’” in the western Balkans and the Middle East.⁵ If EU member states continue to frustrate Ankara by stalling negotiations and refusing to open new chapters, they will find that Turkey has little incentive not to develop an independent foreign policy in competition with that of the EU.

Figure 1 *Multipolar Europe in figures*

	EU	RUSSIA	TURKEY
POPULATION 2010	501M	140M	76M
GDP 2009	\$14.1 TRILLION	\$882 BILLION	\$528 BILLION
POST-CRISIS GROWTH ESTIMATE	1.5%	3.3%	4.3%
POPULATION 2025	514M	140M	85M
GDP 2025	\$17.9 TRILLION	\$2.1 TRILLION	\$1.7 TRILLION
POPULATION 2050	510M	126M	97M
GDP 2050	\$25.8 TRILLION	\$4.2 TRILLION	\$3.4 TRILLION

Sources: Eurostat, CIA World Factbook, IMF, Population Reference Bureau, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (Population projections do not account for migration).

The risk is that this multipolar Europe will be increasingly defined by a competition between the three regional powers – the EU, Russia and Turkey – for influence in a contested neighbourhood made up of the new states created out of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. What makes the EU, Russia and Turkey special is that while other European states merely have ‘neighbours’, these three powers have all declared that they have ‘neighbourhoods’ – and have developed policies to shape these neighbours according to their strategic visions. These neighbourhoods increasingly overlap with each other, creating a risk of classical competition between great powers. But this rivalry also allows the states in the neighbourhood to pick and choose à la carte from different neighbourhood policies, making it increasingly difficult for any of the great powers to achieve their own policy goals.

The dynamics of this multipolar Europe can be best illustrated by considering four recent crises and the responses to them: the question of the status of Kosovo before and after its declaration of independence in February 2008; the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008; the crisis in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010; and the failure of the international community to promote constitutional changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The issue of Kosovo’s final status showed how international institutions can become entrapped in great-power competition. The West bet that Moscow would ultimately back Kosovo’s independence in the UN Security Council, but this turned out to be a false expectation: although Kosovo itself did not matter much for the Russians, the creation of a more multipolar European order in which Russia has a veto power was of great importance for the Kremlin, so Moscow blocked the Kosovo independence at the UN, thus increasing the risks for ethnic conflicts and instability.

The Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 was an example of traditional sphere-of-influence politics. It easily fits into the logic of the ‘contested neighbourhood’ in which two great powers – in this case the West and Russia – struggle over decisive influence in a certain region. Russia acted against Georgia in order to demonstrate its will to secure a sphere of privileged interests on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Turkey, for its part, used the conflict to assert its role as an independent regional power.

The situation in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 offers a striking example of another potential danger for Europe’s security. In this central Asian republic, Russia and the EU want to limit their involvement to guaranteeing their specific interests

(for example transit routes) and are reluctant to take greater responsibility for the country. Here, the risk is not old-fashioned military rivalry but state failure encouraged by outsiders' indifference and inaction.

The failure of the international community to promote constitutional changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrates another risk of the current dysfunctional institutional environment. The EU and Turkey share similar goals when it comes to overcoming the current deadlock in Bosnia. However, although Turkey increased its political and economic presence in the region by focusing on mediation and developing bilateral relations with some of the major players in the region, it did not fully support the so-called Butmir process, the EU-US initiative on constitutional reform. It was more important for Turkey to show how much its support was needed than to contribute to the solution of the crisis.

These four examples show the limits of each of the main ways that Europeans have tried to establish order: integration, intervention, containment and mediation. In each case, none of Europe's primary security forums – the OSCE, NATO and the CSTO – was able either to prevent the crises from emerging nor resolve them after they erupted. Collectively, these crises show that Europe is left with a collection of Cold War institutions that no longer work and no longer satisfy the other powers that live in the European space.

Figure 2 *Security philosophies*

	EUROPEAN UNION	RUSSIA	TURKEY
ATTITUDES TO SOVEREIGNTY	Pooled sovereignty	Sovereignty as state capacity	Westphalian
FOREIGN POLICY AIMS	Values/norms	Interests	Interests
IDEA OF POWER	Soft/human	Hard	Soft/hard
APPROACH TO INTERDEPENDENCE	Multilateralism	Multipolarity	Multipolarity
ROOTS OF SECURITY	Europeanisation	Self-sufficiency	Leveraging regional connections to obtain voice in global affairs

Figure 3 *Approaches to the runaway neighbourhood*

	EUROPEAN UNION	RUSSIA	TURKEY
WESTERN BALKANS	Remain dominant pole of attraction	Control energy transit routes	Project own neighbourhood policy
	Continue enlargement to avoid management of a ring of protectorates	Balance the presence of the EU and US in the region	Supportive of EU integration of the western Balkans
EASTERN PARTNERSHIP	Prevent the emergence of a Russian sphere of influence	Establishing a sphere of influence as a buffer zone to prevent destabilisation of Russia proper	Prosperity of the Black Sea Region
	Promote prosperity and state-building to prevent spill-over of instability to the EU	Economic integration to boost the Russian elite's economic interests	Stability in the South Caucasus
CENTRAL ASIA	Stability Energy security	Maintain military presence and control energy transit routes	Energy security
		Balance China's rising presence in the region	Maintain a position of a mediating power

The cooperation and competition between the three emerging poles of the multipolar Europe – the EU, Russia and Turkey – will shape Europe's security agenda in the years to come and will determine whether the trend of destabilization on the continent's periphery that is now visible continues. As a response to this emerging multipolar Europe, many in the EU and the US have begun experimenting with an alternative to the 'democratic enlargement' paradigm – one that could be called 'interest-based realism'.

Many Western policymakers, guided by this outlook, prefer to view Russia – its revisionist tendencies notwithstanding – as a status quo power whose interests overlap in many areas with their own. In other words, they are increasingly attempting to accommodate rather than transform Russia. The best example of this is President Obama's attempt to 'reset' relations with Russia by recognising its new role in Europe and giving Moscow an upgraded place in the existing Cold War

institutions. There are both minimalist versions of this approach (which involve the inclusion of Russia in missile defence or boosting the NATO-Russia Council) and maximalist variants (which involve inviting Russia to join NATO. However, interest-based realism is no more capable of creating a genuine European order than democratic enlargement. It may be an ambitious approach that aims to reinvent the European order, but it suffers from three major weaknesses.

First, it focuses on Russia as a global rather than as a European power: thus, it may offer good prospects for getting Russian support to deal with threats from Iran and Afghanistan, but it is less clear that it can help solve problems in the contested neighbourhood. Second, it underestimates Russia's interests in keeping its own options open: Russia could seek a strategic partnership with the West while continuing to position itself as a member of the BRIC countries (alongside Brazil, India and China). Third, it ignores the tension between Russia's threat perceptions and those of eastern Europe: Russia perceives any alliance or security arrangement from which it is excluded as hostile. This is why EU member states need fresh thinking. The EU can do little to prevent the diffusion of power within Europe. The key question is whether it can turn the multipolar order into one that works through multilateral cooperation rather than spheres of influence. In order to answer it, we need to understand in more detail the shifts that have taken place in each of the three emerging European poles – as well in the unspoken fourth actor, the United States.

Chapter 2:

The EU's new security dilemma

The European Union, alongside the United States, saw itself as the big winner of the Cold War. Through German reunification and the enlargement of NATO and the EU, it was able to spread its zone of peace eastwards. Through the creation of a single market and a single currency, it created a foundation for prosperity. And by investing in the development of global governance – the World Trade Organisation, the Kyoto protocol, the International Criminal Court, and initiatives such as the ‘responsibility to protect’ – the EU was able to advance its norms on a planetary scale. However, in the last decade, and in particular since the eurozone crisis of 2009-10, EU leaders have lost their confidence. What once looked like universal trends – post-sovereignty, demilitarisation, secularism – now look like exceptional features of the EU project.

At the same time, many of the EU's apparent triumphs are now coming back to haunt it: Russia resents its supposed humiliation; the rising economic powers that have benefited from globalisation do not support the EU's global multilateral agenda; the euro remains in trouble; and the financial crisis reveals the structural contradictions at the heart of the EU's unfinished project, as member states' economies need more immigrants than their populations seem ready to tolerate and monetary union needs more political integration than their elites are able to deliver. But the major policy effect of the crisis is paradoxical: both the public and the policy elites in EU member states are disappointed by the EU's performance, yet nonetheless increasingly see the EU as a key player not only in the economy but also in foreign and security policy.

What does Europe fear?

As part of the research for this report, ECFR conducted a unique survey of the foreign-policy elites of all 27 member states, which included more than 250 interviews and a study of the national-security documents of the member states. We expected that it would show a wide range of incompatible threat perceptions and confirm the structural divisions among EU member states on their relations with great powers such as Russia or the US. Instead, however, the survey found a surprising convergence between the threat perceptions of member states: besides their immediate fear of economic crisis, most states share concerns about uncontrolled migration and climate change. Even where they have different fears, they don't split the member states as profoundly as they did five years ago.

The security challenge for the EU today is not rooted in classical geopolitics; on the contrary, it seems to be a product of Europe's geopolitical ease. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates complained in February 2010 that "the demilitarization of Europe – where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it – has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st."⁶ But our survey suggests that Europe has 'demilitarised' in a different way than Gates believed. It is not that the EU lacks military capacity or the will to fight, rather that the EU's foreign-policy elites have fundamentally redefined what they mean by security. Our survey points to three main trends in the way EU security elites conceptualize the threats to their society and to the EU.

First, the EU's security elites increasingly look at security through the eyes of insurance companies rather than military planners.⁷ They take peace for granted and think in terms of risks instead of threats. In other words, where the military is interested in assessing the probability of specific threats from known opponents working according to a logic of appropriateness and proportionality ('Does our response match the threat?'), insurance planners focus on imagining 'unknown unknowns'. The strategic aim is to be prepared for the unexpected and therefore in general to increase governance capacity. In fact, none of the EU's 27 member states seems to fear military occupation.

⁶ Robert M. Gates, US secretary of defense, speech at National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 23 February, 2010; available at <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1423>.

⁷ The authors would like to thank Olaf Corry for this striking insight.

Figure 4 What are security threats your country currently faces?




Figure 5 *My country's army is best able to:*

Austria			
Belgium			
Bulgaria			
Czech Republic			
Cyprus			
Denmark			
Estonia			
Finland			
France			
Germany			
Greece			
Hungary			
Ireland			
Italy			
Latvia			
Lithuania			
Luxembourg			
The Netherlands			
Poland			
Portugal			
Malta			
Romania			
Slovakia			
Slovenia		Cyprus	
Spain		Denmark	
Sweden	France	France	
United Kingdom	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	
UNDERTAKE PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS	IN ADDITION TO PEACEKEEPING, PROJECT POWER OVER LONG DISTANCES	IN ADDITION TO PEACEKEEPING, FIGHT AT HIGH INTENSITY	REMAIN IN THEATRE FOR LENGTHY PERIODS OF TIME

Even after the shock of the Georgian war, most EU member states claim to feel safer than they did five years ago and regard a major war in Europe as unthinkable. Thus the EU's security elites do not feel they should spend more on defence despite their relatively low level of military spending and the resulting shift in the military balance of the EU and other powers. The results of the survey support the hypothesis of the French foreign-policy thinker Zaki Laïdi that the EU is a "risk-averse power." It accords greater importance to civilian systemic risks than military ones and is particularly interested in protecting public goods. This means that, more than other actors, it will reject the use of force outright and propose alternatives based on cooperation.

Second, the vacuum left by the absence of war has been filled with post-modern fears. While Russia and Turkey worry about their borders and status, EU security elites are mainly concerned about defending their way of life. Apart from a nod at terrorism, our survey showed that what EU security elites fear are threats to their standards of living: the impact of the financial crisis; energy insecurity; climate change; immigration. This reveals a strong tendency to translate security problems into economic and social issues that can be dealt with by regulation, criminal justice or technology rather than classical foreign and military policies. Because the main threat they perceived was not of war between big European powers but of instability and chaos in between (the 'internal abroad'), EU security elites generally fear weak neighbours as much as strong neighbours. Their strategic aim is to be prepared for the unexpected and therefore in general to increase governance capacity.


EU citizens and their leaders seem to share with security elites this increasingly post-modern attitude to threats. For example, one recent Gallup poll found that more than 62 per cent of EU citizens believe that the EU should focus on development rather than expanding their military role. Meanwhile 38 per cent of EU citizens think that climate change is a more important threat than al-Qaeda-type terrorism.⁸ The survey shows that the economic crisis seems to have accelerated the shift in the EU's attitudes to security. Where previous generations of EU leaders were defined by 1989, Kosovo, 9/11 and Iraq, this generation has been defined by the global economic crisis. This shift in priorities explains why they want to cut rather than increase military spending; to scale down their involvement in missions in faraway places like Afghanistan; and to return the problem of order to local elites.

⁸ Robert Manchin, "Europeans 2010. Trends and Diverging Views on Future, Global Safety, War & Peace". The authors would like to thank Robert Manchin of Gallup for sharing these findings.

Third, Europeans increasingly fear that they are becoming marginalised as power shifts away from the West. This is the first time in 500 years that European security has been a regional rather than a global question. Europe is now neither the central problem nor the central solution in the global order. Our survey showed that almost all member states are interested in what William Walker has called “positional security;” that is, “where they stand in the world, who they stand with, and how to improve or regain their standing.”⁹

Figure 6

How do you see your country’s position in the international system?



* ‘hinge power’: a power which is not great in size but its contribution is critical for its region or for a certain issue (e.g. financial regulation; peacekeeping, etc.)

Sensitivities on this issue are greatest among both elites and the public in the largest member states. French elites fear “that in the future France will not be able to continue to be a major actor at the global level.” Yet a surprising 62 per cent of Germans claimed in a recent poll that their involvement in Afghanistan has increased their country’s international standing. Britons increasingly fear that Washington is losing interest in Europe – a recent opinion poll showed that 85 per cent of respondents thought that Britain had little influence over American policy. Polish elites, for their part, fear that Germany and Russia will reach agreements that are, as one respondent put it, “about us yet without us.” Smaller member states such as the Czech Republic, Estonia and Luxembourg also have a fear of being sandwiched by the preferences of other great powers as the fulcrum of global politics moves away from Europe.


What does Europe hope for?

Alongside these shifts in threat perceptions, European countries seem to be rethinking their approach to security. Most surprisingly, they seem to be outgrowing the divisions that have afflicted the EU over the last decade. Since Donald Rumsfeld famously divided the EU into “new” and “old” Europe in the approach to the war in Iraq, there has been an assumption that EU member states would continue to seek the backing of Washington or Moscow to strengthen their positions within the EU. But the survey showed that while the shift in the security focus of elites has not wiped out the geographical differences between East and West, it has changed their significance. Since the financial crisis, European leaders seem to have become less wedded to traditional geopolitical alliances (such as that with the US) or enmities (such as against Russia) than their predecessors.

Our survey suggests three key shifts in EU thinking about security. First, there has been a narrowing of the divisions on how to deal with Russia. The Russia-Georgia war has tempered expectations in ‘old Europe’ about the extent to which Russia has been transformed by the EU’s attempts to integrate it into common structures. Meanwhile, ‘new Europe’ has become more sceptical about the prospects of containing Russia. Central Europe is less anti-Russian than most assume, and the Hungarians in our survey even think that Russia might one day join the EU. Similarly, the Baltic states are repositioning themselves: the Latvians in our survey are less worried about Russian troublemaking than about their own government’s capacity to mishandle its side of the bilateral relationship. Most dramatically, Poland – which was once called the ‘new Cold

Warrior’ for its hawkish views on Moscow – is now working with Germany, Russia’s ‘strategic partner’, to figure out the right ingredients for the EU policy mix on Russia.


Figure 7 *Russia is my country’s*



It is fair to say that, even after the rapprochement following the Smolensk air tragedy in April 2010, Warsaw has not changed its mind about Moscow’s intentions; but it has recognised that it gained little from blocking common EU positions on Russia, and that as long as divisions among EU member states persist, Russia will exploit them to isolate the new states while building economic interdependence with the old ones. Meanwhile, Obama’s policy of “reset” with Moscow has contributed to the EU’s new unity towards Russia. Most European policymakers have realised that Washington prefers to treat Russia as a global and not as a European power, and that US policy towards Moscow is bound to be in flux as Russia’s strategic importance for the US declines. As a result, most EU member states realise that on issues of regional importance, they are left to deal with Russia on their own.

Second, although many among EU elites still support EU and NATO enlargement, they have lost faith in its ability to act as the main institutional framework for European security. While most of the member states think that enlargement played a significant historical role in enhancing European security, they also feel that it is now reaching its limits as a political project.¹⁰ The western Balkans is the only place in Europe where the question for everyone is not ‘if’ but ‘when’. Many member states still believe that Turkey

Figure 8 *How likely it is that Turkey joins the EU in 10 years’ time?*



¹⁰ See Ron Asmus, “Is enlargement dead?” German Marshall Fund, May 2010; available at http://209.200.80.89//doc/OnWider_Series_May_Asmus_Final.pdf.

should be allowed to join the EU, but even those most in favour of Turkish accession do not expect it to happen within the next 10-15 years (see appendix). And the prospect of enlarging the EU and NATO to former Soviet republics is a distant one, not a question for today or even tomorrow. Some of them are flirting with authoritarianism, which further reduces the EU's willingness to open its door to new accession candidates.


These findings suggest that European policymakers no longer see enlargement and security policy as mutually reinforcing, as they did for much of the post-Cold War period. In the 1990s Robert Cooper, the EU's director general for politico-military affairs, was fond of quoting Catherine the Great's dictum that "I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them." The EU thought it could bring security to the continent by sharing its institutions with its neighbours. These days, however, many seem to view NATO and EU enlargement as a source not of security but of insecurity because they fear it will cause unnecessary tension with Russia and dilute EU cohesion. The perceived failure of the 'colour revolutions' in Ukraine and Georgia contributed to EU policymakers' change of mind as significantly as the sense of overstretch after the wave of enlargement between 2004 and 2007.

Third, there is now agreement among EU security elites about the need to give the EU a greater role in dealing with security challenges on the European continent. The survey shows that while they still believe that NATO will be around in some shape or form in 2020, they also increasingly agree that the EU will become ever more important as a provider of European security. Most Europeans still view the US and NATO as indispensable to continue to provide the underlying guarantee against the recurrence of major war in Europe – a risk with an ever-diminishing probability of occurrence, but so catastrophic if it did eventuate that it's essential to keep on paying the insurance premium. But since NATO is a military alliance, it is not the right instrument to address all the other less catastrophic but much more probable sources of insecurity – such as climate change, immigration and organised crime – that Europe has to deal with on a day-to-day basis. It is striking, in this context, to see that even David Cameron's mildly euro-sceptic UK government strongly supports an expanded role for the EU and the new European External Action Service (EAS) in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Taken together, these findings show that EU governments feel safer than ever before, but also more insecure. The paradox is that while they are enormously critical of the EU's performance as a security actor, they are driven by external

circumstances to the conclusion that the EU will need to play a bigger role in ensuring their continent's stability in the future. Support for an expanded EU role as security provider also reflects a growing realisation of the new reality in which Europe has lost its central place in US foreign policy. As a result, the EU will increasingly have to deal with the other poles in the European space – including Russia – alone.

Figure 9 *What is currently more important to European security?*



Chapter 3:

The discreet charm of Russia's revisionism

The 'Russian question' has been one of the most challenging conundrums for architects of European order over the last three centuries. Russia has always been a vast, ethnically diverse and under-populated country that felt threatened by its geography, its history, its demography and its economy. But the peculiar combination of strengths and weaknesses in today's Russia make it even more complex than before 1991. Stephen Kotkin has aptly observed that "Russia inherited everything that caused the Soviet collapse, as well as the collapse itself."

At present, Russia has European birth rates and African life expectancy; it possesses the world's second biggest nuclear-weapons arsenal but makes less than one per cent of the world's hi-tech products. Its network of gas and oil pipelines is the longest in the world, but it is more corrupt than Sierra Leone. Russia is a federal state in the terms of its constitution, a centralized state in the ambitions of its rulers and a highly fractured and feudalized entity in the way the power is exercised in reality. These contradictions mean that Russian threat perceptions are complex and constantly evolving. And, like the EU, Russia's foreign-policy elite today has a very different view of threats and European order than it did just a few years ago.

The sources of Russian insecurity

Officially, the Kremlin still sees NATO's enlargement in the post-Soviet space as the major threat to Russia's security. However, a study of the threat perceptions conducted in 2008 by a think-tank that is close to the Kremlin shows that at both the federal and regional level Russian elites tend to view demography, energy dependency, corruption, ethnic and religious separatism and even Chinese illegal immigration across Russia's far-eastern border as much bigger threats.

Figure 10 *What are the major threats Russia faces today?*

THREAT	%
Demographic Crisis	31.5
Energy Overdependence	18.5
Global Nationalism and Insecurity	18.5
Poverty and Class Divide	16
Corruption	15.4
Alcoholism and Drugs Abuse	12
Lack of Values or Faith in Russia	11.7
Globalization	6.2
Authoritarianism	5.0
NATO Enlargement or Military Attacks	4.3
Criminality	4.3
Ecological Threats	4.0

Source: Сумма Идеологии. Мирозрение и Идеология Современной Росийской Элиты. Институт Общественного Проектирования, 2008, p.200. These findings are based on a survey in which 326 representatives of Russia's federal and local elites responded to the question "What are the major threats Russia faces today?" and were allowed to name as many threats as they wanted.

Underlying these answers, it can be seen that Russian foreign policy is shaped by four central fears, some of them deeply rooted in Russian history.¹¹

The first longstanding Russian fear is of the country's ill-defined, unstable and under-populated borders. Within the EU, there is a growing consensus that national boundaries are losing much of their traditional importance; but Russia still worries profoundly about its borders. In fact, according to a recent poll, almost half of the population of the country tends to view the current frontiers as temporary – some expect Russia to gain territory in the future, others expect Russia to lose it.¹² This anxiety about borders has been exacerbated by the 'reliable instability' of the north Caucasus, which Russians increasingly view as their 'internal abroad'. The north Caucasus remains so dangerous, even after the end of

¹¹ See Robert Legvold, ed., *Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century and the Shadow of the Past*, Columbia University Press, 2007.

¹² See Alexey Malashenko, *Losing the Caucasus*, Carnegie Moscow Center briefing, August 2009.

major military operations in Chechnya, that in 2009 more representatives of the Russian state were killed there than US soldiers killed in Iraq.¹³

Russia also continues to worry about its unstable borders because, during Vladimir Putin's two terms as president, the alliances in which Russia is embedded failed to reduce its sense of insecurity. The CSTO is dysfunctional because of the tensions between its members – as its inaction in the course of the Kyrgyzstan crisis illustrated. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an important pillar in Russia's Asia policy, but the decision of its members to boycott Moscow's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia war made many in Moscow fear that the Chinese have successfully turned the organisation – which started as a joint initiative by Beijing and Moscow – into an instrument for extending their influence in Central Asia. Meanwhile although Russia values the OSCE, it recognises its limitations.

The second fear that shapes Russian foreign policy is of economic backwardness. In the pre-crisis decade, Russia demonstrated impressive growth of around 7 per cent per year, which led some economists to include it – alongside Brazil, India and China – in the BRIC group of large emerging economies. However, the financial crisis – which hurt Russia more than any other member of the G20 – put an end to this illusion. What worries the Kremlin is that four-fifths of Russia's export revenues come from the basic commodity sector, which includes metals, gas and oil. In fact, Russia is now more dependent on natural resources than it was during the Soviet era. As a result, the Russian economy is highly dependent on commodity prices and, as the global financial crisis illustrated, extremely vulnerable to external shocks. For the first time in its history, Russia is now less developed economically than all its important neighbours to both the west and the east. This fear of being left behind has led to a rethink of Russian strategy: according to a leaked memo, President Medvedev's political allies insist that building alliances in order to modernise the economy should be the major objective of Russia's foreign policy today.¹⁴

A third fear is of ethnic and religious conflict within Russia. Russia is a multinational state that is struggling to develop a new identity that reconciles its imperial and Soviet pasts. Regional inequalities are huge and growing and

¹³ In 2009, 150 US soldiers were killed in Iraq, while more than 230 Russian police officers and soldiers died in the north Caucasus. For the respective figures, see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties.htm and <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100116/157570882.html>

¹⁴ The memo was leaked to the Russian edition of *Newsweek*; see <http://www.runewsweek.ru/country/34184/>.

religious identities are increasingly strong, making Russian society vulnerable to the spread of ethnic and religious separatism. To many among Russia's elites, its Muslim population – which is bigger as a proportion of the population than that of any other European state – poses a particular problem. Russia's economy needs around 10 million labour migrants annually. The majority of them are likely to be Muslims from the central Asian republics; it is estimated that, a decade from now, one in three recruits to the Russian army will be of Muslim origin. In the absence of effective institutions and an inclusive political system, it feels to many in the Russian elite like a recipe for crisis.

These three fears are exacerbated by a fourth fear based on the insecurity of the Russian elite and the nature of its political regime. The collapse of the USSR injected an enduring sense of fragility and instability into the Russian elite's view of the world. Russia is therefore constantly oscillating between its conservative instinct for stability and the temptation to join the club of disaffected countries. The best way to make sense of these fears is to view Russia as an unfinished state-building project. The objective of this project is to consolidate a new political identity for the Russian state that can allow it to modernise in order to regain its great-power status but at the same time prevent it from disintegration. Russian foreign policy therefore aims above all to create a hard-shelled state that will be integrated into the global economy but protected from external political influence. Russia's attitude to the European order is characterised by a mixture of nostalgia for the era of the 'concert of Europe' and envy of present-day China, which is apparently succeeding in both opening its economy to the West and simultaneously rejecting any western interference in its domestic politics. Russia longs for a return to an old-fashioned European order organised around the balance of power between nation states that do not interfere in each other's domestic affairs. Unlike the EU or Turkey, Russian elites view the very nature of the post-Cold War European order – a zone of interdependence and mutual intervention in each other's internal affairs – as a security threat.

Russia's new *Westpolitik*

Russia's relationship with the EU has already gone through several phases since the end of the Cold War; they can be best described as neglect, hope, panic and economic *Realpolitik*. During the 1990s, Russian foreign policy focused primarily on the US and neglected relations with the EU. Subsequently, during the lead-up to the Iraq war, President Putin invested a lot of effort in building a strategic partnership with France and Germany in order to balance the US and isolate

eastern Europe. But since the colour revolutions in the post-Soviet space, Moscow has come to see the EU as a revisionist power that is attempting to extend its sphere of influence to the Russian border.

During his second term, President Putin tried to make a Russia an alternative to the EU: it used its economic power to split the EU and deployed hard and soft power to increase its influence over the six states in the post-Soviet space. However, the Russian elite now increasingly realises both that the EU's revisionism is exhausted and EU enlargement is reaching its natural limits and that Moscow's attempt to be an alternative Europe has failed. Out of this realisation has emerged a new Westpolitik that is centred on four objectives:

- to assert Russia's European identity
- to make economic development the major objective of Russia's foreign policy
- to develop strategic cooperation with the US while keeping intense contacts with the new centres of global influence such as China, India and Brazil
- to focus on strategic cooperation with some key European states, above all Germany, while accepting the reality of the EU.

This policy, unlike Putin's post-Orange Revolution revisionism, presents a real opening for a more cooperative relationship. But this new approach is based on foundations that are still quite fragile. Influential parts of the Russian security elite are deeply mistrustful towards the West and are in favour of a more confrontational approach. The decline of Medvedev's influence could result in a fading away of his initiatives. The strategy of using foreign policy as a source of modernising the economy could also easily backfire if the Kremlin remains reluctant to democratise Russian institutions. The former economics minister German Gref spoke for many when he said that the Russian state should be the *object* of modernisation, not the *instrument* of modernisation. Moreover, the dynamics of the current US-Russia relationship – which is critically important for the improvement in the atmosphere within Russia – could also dramatically change. Although polls indicate that for the moment 61 per cent of Americans approve President Obama's reset policy, it also has powerful domestic opponents. A change of leadership in the US could easily result in a return to a more confrontational relationship.

Russia's neighbourhood policy

Although Russia may now be more open to a partnership with the EU than it was, it is likely to remain a difficult partner. To understand why, it is necessary to understand Moscow's concept of a 'sovereign power'. The Kremlin sees sovereignty not as a right but as a capacity for economic independence, military strength and cultural identity. According to this definition, none of the post-Soviet states, except for Russia itself, can be considered sovereign. They could become independent and self-governed states but their independence will derive from the relations they develop with the great powers rather than their endogenous strengths. It is therefore not surprising that Russia tends to view the enlargement of NATO and the EU not as the extension of a legitimate European order but as expansion of the West's sphere of influence.

Russia's neighbourhood policy is not simply, as some assume, an attempt to turn the clock back to the Soviet era. In fact, contrary to the conventional view, Russia does not have territorial aspirations towards its neighbours, or at least this is not at the heart of its neighbourhood policy. As its response to the crisis in Kyrgyzstan this year showed, Moscow is very aware of the danger of 'imperial overstretch'. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is not interested in imposing any specific regime in these countries – at present the Kremlin prefers to deal with the democratically elected Viktor Yanukovych than with the authoritarian Alexander Lukashenka – but it does want to dominate certain strategic sectors of its neighbours' economies and to use its neighbourhood as a source of regional and global influence. With this in mind, its neighbourhood policy follows four principles.

First, Russian elites will do their best to resist the West's policies of transformation or containment. They see foreign policy as a tool to secure the survival of the regime and not simply to defend national interests, which explains why Moscow will never accept Ukraine's or Georgia's membership in NATO and will never encourage Ukraine to join the EU. Second, Russia views its control over the export routes of gas and oil coming from the post-Soviet space as a precondition for Russia's global role. Third, Russia wants to create favourable conditions in the post-Soviet space for the development of Russian business, which is currently uncompetitive. In particular, it sees it as a source of Russian-speaking labour. Certain parts of the Russian elite believe the current economic crisis could lead to major disruptions in globalisation and expect regionalization to be the new trend; this lies behind Moscow's quest to create a customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus. Fourth, Russia aims to expand its cultural influence and, in particular, preserve the role of the Russian language as a *lingua franca* for elites in the post-Soviet space.

Russia's strategic objectives in its neighbourhood mean that it places huge importance on developing a strategic partnership with Turkey. Thus Moscow is encouraging the rise of Turkey as an independent centre of power and an energy hub. The EU and Russia are therefore likely to continue to compete with each other in the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, in the absence of a European security order that it perceives as legitimate, Russia is likely to do its best to institutionalise its sphere of influence through institutionalising its military presence in its neighbourhood. For example, Russia has made current security arrangements with Ukraine (set to last until 2042) and with Armenia (to last until 2044).

But while competition will remain a feature of the EU-Russia relationship, the economic crisis and President Medvedev's new *Westpolitik* create a real opportunity for the West to cooperate with Russia in a way it could not have a few years ago. Russia has an interest in creating a new European security architecture, which could help Russia to assert its key security role, to confirm the CSTO as a major security actor, to win guarantees against NATO's further enlargement, and to bring central Asia into the European security space, thus building an alliance against China's rising influence in the region. Furthermore, it is in Russia's interests to agree a new security treaty sooner rather than later. Although Russia is currently positioning itself as a rising power, many in the Russian elite realise the country's medium-term prospects are not so good and fear that Russia's recent resurgence could simply represent the temporary rise of a declining power. In our view, the EU's tactical response to Medvedev's proposal is therefore wrong. It is true that the draft is dangerously empty and ambiguous. It insists on legally binding agreements, even though Moscow does not have a good track record of following through on commitments it has already made. It can be argued that Medvedev's proposal is just that – a proposal that lacks support in the government and the foreign-policy establishment beyond President Medvedev and his closest circle of advisors.

However, the proposal also has some positive features: it identifies Russia as a European power at the moment the European continent as a whole risks being marginalised; it does not challenge the normative foundations of the existing European order; and, contrary to the fears of many Europeans, it recognizes the US as a European power and accepts NATO's role on the continent. By ignoring this opening, the EU risks missing a real opportunity to re-legitimize the normative base on which the post-Cold War European order was founded.

Chapter 4:

Turkey: an actor, not an issue

Once on the periphery of the West, Turkey has gradually emerged as the centre of its own world, which encompasses the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans and even areas further afield such as the Gulf and North Africa. As Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said in an interview: “Turkey is an actor, not an issue.”¹⁵

The post-Cold War European security order does not always sit comfortably with such ambitions. For much of the post-1989 period, Turkey’s main foreign policy objective was integration into the EU. But as major EU member states have become less enthusiastic about enlargement, Turkish decision-makers have begun to hedge their bets and cultivate ties with Middle Eastern neighbours and Russia. Although Ankara is committed to EU accession and remains a staunch NATO ally, its foreign-policy actions have, on several occasions, challenged the US and the EU on strategically important issues such as Iran’s nuclear programme.

This shift in Turkish policy takes place against a background of increasing instability in Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood. The Iraq war exacerbated tensions between Washington and Ankara that had been simmering under the surface since the early 1990s.¹⁶ The intervention increased instability in Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood and was seen as (re-)opening the Pandora’s box of Kurdish separatism. Meanwhile, the push for NATO enlargement in the ex-Soviet space spearheaded by the George W. Bush administration threatened to radicalise Russia and upset carefully constructed balances to the north of Turkey. Together, the stalled negotiations with the EU and Bush-era US

¹⁵ Delphine Strauss and David Gardner, “Turkey: The sentinel swivels”, *Financial Times*, 20 July 2010.

¹⁶ See Ian Lesser, Turkey, the United States and the Delusion of Geopolitics, *Survival*, 48 (3), Autumn 2006, 83-96.

assertiveness have nudged Turkey towards a more independent foreign policy that serves what it sees as vital economic and security interests.

Turkey's confident diplomacy is underpinned by its solid economic performance. The country's gross domestic product (in PPP terms) expanded rapidly from \$589 bn in 2000 to \$991 bn in 2008, earning Turkey a place in the G20 as the world's 16th largest economy. What is more, Turkey has largely recovered from the economic crisis that swept the globe in 2008-09, with growth projected at 5% in 2010. The country's progressive insertion into the global economy from the 1980s onwards, reinforced by the customs union with the EU in 1996, has proven to be a potent growth engine.¹⁷ The global financial markets rewarded Turkey's stability of political leadership throughout the 2000s, with foreign direct investment inflows reaching some \$18.3 billion in 2008. Trade and investment links with key partners in western Europe also bolstered Turkey's economic presence in neighbouring countries, which have themselves been drawn into EU-driven liberalisation schemes such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Turkey's economic growth also draws on historical legacies, trading networks and cross-border kinship ties linking Turkey to a circle of countries in its environs. Meanwhile, the EU's pursuit of diversified supplies from the Middle East, the Caspian and central Asia have made Turkey an indispensable energy hub. This is especially visible in the field of gas: Ankara is a key player in high-profile projects such as the Nabucco pipeline (see figure 11 overleaf on Turkey as an energy hub). Last but not least, growth has allowed Turkey to maintain its high rates of military spending and to have at its disposal the second largest conventional armed force in NATO after the US. The Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that Turkey's spending in this area in 2009 was nearly \$20 billion, or 2.2 per cent of GDP.

A post-Kemalist foreign policy

Since its foundation in 1923, the Republic of Turkey has been a Westernizing – but not consistently a pro-Western – polity. Most of the republic's founding fathers came from the Balkan provinces lost as the Ottoman Empire disintegrated; and having witnessed this process they harboured a deep

resentment of western great powers and a strong attachment to national sovereignty.

Turkey's founding myth is based on a belief in a strong state remaking a 'backward' society in the image of western modernity, while countering, if need be by brute force, any challenges to its authority. This myth began to be eroded in the 1950s as the ideological rigidity of the one-party Kemalist regime gave way to a more pluralist but also more unstable political system.

In the 1980s, President Turgut Özal's reforms freed the statist economy, spurring export-led expansion and sectoral diversification. But economic liberalisation also empowered a new middle class in the conservative and pious Anatolian periphery, much of which supports the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP). Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP has embarked on a prolonged battle against the military and bureaucratic establishment, which singled out the party as enemy number one. The latest episode in this struggle between the AKP and the secularist elite, represented by the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP), was the constitutional referendum of 12 September 2010.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP have crafted a new and ambitious foreign policy, which pursues a particular version of the idea of 'strategic depth'. The foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu proposes that Turkey should seek to deepen its political and economic links with countries and regions across its borders in order to both to secure 'zero problems with neighbours' and obtain a stronger voice in global affairs. This approach is reflected by Ankara's effort in recent years (albeit with variable success) to act as an intermediary in regional flashpoints from Palestine to Bosnia, and to resolve history-laden issues with Armenia.

Turkey is now a key player in the Middle East and aspires to lead the Islamic world, an ambition illustrated by the clash with Israel over the seizure of the *Mavi Marmara* aid flotilla and Ankara's vote in the UN Security Council against the imposition of sanctions on Iran. The strategy entails Turkey acting as what Philip Robins aptly terms "a double-gravity state" that links both to the Euro-Atlantic Community and to its Middle Eastern neighbourhood.¹⁸ On occasion, Turkey has been prepared to confront the US and its NATO allies.

¹⁸ Philip Robins, "A Double-Gravity State: Turkish Foreign Policy Reconsidered" (the 2005 BRISMES Lecture), *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 33 (2), November 2006, pp. 199-211.

Figure 11 *Turkey as an energy hub*

	BASIC FACTS	TURKEY'S INVOLVEMENT
IN OPERATION		
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline	1,768 km long; operational since May 2006; daily capacity: 1 million barrels	669 km on Turkish territory, including the Ceyhan terminal. 6.53% in the ownership consortium
South Caucasus (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, BTE) gas pipeline	669 km on Turkish territory, including the Ceyhan terminal. 6.53% in the ownership consortium	Turkey holds 9% in the consortium, main consumer
Tabriz-Ankara gas pipeline	2,577 km long, operational since 2001; annual capacity: 10 bcm	BOTAŞ operates the Turkish section, Turkey is the consumer
Blue Stream gas pipeline	1,213 km, links Russia and Turkey through a pipe running under the Black Sea, operational since February 2003, annual capacity: 16 bcm	Turkey owns sections on its territory, the sub-sea section belongs to a consortium between Gazprom and Italy's ENI. Turkey is the consumer, 2/3 of its gas supplies come from Russia
Interconnector Turkey-Greece (ITG) (gas)	296 km long, operational since November 2007, annual capacity: 7 bcm (currently working at 0.7)	210 km on Turkish territory, establishes Turkey as a transit country
Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline	970 km long, operational since 1976, daily capacity: 1.6 million barrels	Turkey hosts Iraq's largest crude oil export line
Western gas pipeline	842 km long, operational since 1988, brings Russian gas to Turkey shipped through Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine, capacity: 8 bcm per year	Turkey is the consumer, 2/3 of its gas supplies come from Russia

The Turkish parliament denied the US the use of its territory in the run-up to the Iraq war in 2003; the government refused to allow US ships into the Black Sea during the conflict in Georgia in August 2008, and in May 2010 cooperated with Brazil in pushing for a soft approach on Iran.

This new post-Kemalist foreign policy has transformed Turkey's relationship with the EU. For a long time, Turkey saw EU membership as the ultimate end of a westward journey that began in the early 19th century. In exchange for this prize, Ankara accepted its role as NATO bastion in the Cold War and, more recently, as pupil to be tutored by the EU on democracy, human and minority rights. However, as accession talks have stalled, the prospect of EU accession

BASIC FACTS		TURKEY'S INVOLVEMENT
PLANNED		
Nabucco gas pipeline	3,300 km long, Intergovernmental agreement signed by Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey in July 2009, capacity: 30 bcm	BOTAŞ holds 16.7% in the construction consortium (equal to other participants), may be sourced with gas from BTE, TAP, Iraq-Turkey and Iraq-Syria pipelines
South Stream gas pipeline	900 km long, linking the Russian terminal of Dzhugba with Varna in Bulgaria and then crossing through Greece into Italy and through Serbia and Hungary into Austria, annual capacity: 63 bcm	In November 2009, Turkey signed an agreement with Russia allowing the pipeline to cross its territorial waters in case Ukraine resists
Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) – gas	807 km long, to extend ITG from Komotini to Otranto and raise annual capacity to 11 bcm	Advances Turkey's role as a transit country
Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline	550 km long, transporting Russian and Kazakh oil from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean; intergovernmental agreement between Turkey, Italy and Russia in October 2009	To relieve traffic through the Straits and upgrade the Ceyhan terminal, alternative to the Burgas-Alexandroupolis project; the shares in the project company are still to be decided
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) – gas	520 km long, to connect Thessaloniki with Brindisi through Albania, annual capacity: 10 bcm	To be supplied by Iranian and Azerbaijani gas transiting through Turkey
Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline	Under discussion, to bring Turkmen and Kazakh gas to BTE, possibly Nabucco, annual capacity: 30 bcm	Advances Turkey's role as a transit country
Iraq-Turkey gas pipeline	Feasibility study commissioned in 2008, annual capacity: 10 bcm	May secure supply for Nabucco

has become more and more distant. Even the Independent Commission on Turkey, which views Ankara's EU bid with sympathy, has concluded that accession is unlikely before 2020.¹⁹ Accession to the EU remains a priority but is certainly not *the* priority for the AKP as it was in 2002-05 – in retrospect the golden era of reform.

¹⁹ Independent Commission on Turkey, *Turkey in Europe: Breaking the Vicious Circle*, September 2009; available at <http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/>.

This shift in policy also reflects a shift in public opinion in Turkey. The most recent edition of the German Marshall Fund's *Transatlantic Trends* finds that support for cooperation with the EU declined in 2009-10 by nine points to 13 per cent; while support for cooperation with the Middle Eastern states on international matters doubled to 20 per cent.²⁰ EU conditionality without a promise of membership is leading to popular discontent, which the AKP is keen to ride out rather than challenge. Turkey would never call off the accession negotiations – as some in western European capitals hoped it would – but Ankara will not compromise with tough EU conditions such as opening ports to Greek Cypriot ships either. In effect, the EU is now merely a facet of a multidimensional foreign policy.

Turkey's attitude to NATO has also grown more ambivalent than in the past. Turkey remains an ally: it is still a strong believer in Article 5; it makes a significant contribution to security missions (such as ISAF in Afghanistan); it supports enlargement to the Balkans and investment in civilian capabilities; it has not vetoed NATO-Israeli defence cooperation, despite the tense relationship with the Jewish state. At the same time, Turkey opposes the presence of NATO in buffer regions such as the Black Sea; is sceptical about proposed US missile-defence systems because it fears they will antagonize Russia and Iran (though it does favour the NATO option over bilateral deals between Washington and its local allies); and tends to veto NATO-EU cooperation because it fears being sidelined by the emergence of a more robust European security and defence policy.

Disenchantment with the EU and the outright rift with the US will certainly not push Turkey into the arms of Iran or Hamas, as some critics of the present government argue. Whatever government is in power, Turkey's economy is and will remain anchored in Europe, while membership in the western alliance will still be a *sine qua non* for Turkey's grand strategy. However, there is a real danger that the blend of electoral populism, the resurgent Kurdish issue and embroilment in assorted conflicts in the Middle East and the southern Caucasus will make Ankara an awkward partner. The robustness of the EU anchor therefore remains critical.²¹ One key litmus test of this is Turkey's very own 'neighbourhood policy'.

²⁰ German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends*, September 2010; available at <http://www.gmfus.org/trends/2010/>.

²¹ Ahmet Evin et al, *Getting to Zero. Turkey, its Neighbours and the West*, Transatlantic Academy, 2010.

Turkey's neighbourhood policy

Turkey's neighbourhood policy (TNP) predates the AKP's 'strategic depth' doctrine. In the 1980s and 1990s, as Turkey's trade with its immediate neighbourhood increased dramatically, politicians such as Turgut Özal and Ismail Cem argued in favour of deeper engagement with Middle Eastern neighbours and cut energy deals with Russia and Iran. Trade across the Turkish-Iraqi border also grew before 2003, in contravention of the sanctions regime. Thus, the neighbourhood policy that crystallized post-2002 is driven not by the AKP's Islamic roots and sense of solidarity with Middle Eastern states but by two pragmatic calculations. First, cooperation with Syria, Iran and (more recently) the Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq, is essential for the containment of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*, PKK). Second, the Middle East, the Gulf and Russia offer lucrative markets for the booming Turkish economy. Nothing illustrates the trend more vividly than Turkey's ever closer ties with its Middle Eastern neighbours. In 2009 nearly 20% of Turkey's exports went to the Middle East, compared with 12.5% in 2004. Trade with Iran has increased more than six-fold since 2002, hitting \$7.5 billion in 2007. Turkish exports to Syria rose from \$1.1 billion in 2008 to \$1.4 billion in 2009. Turkish officials hope to attract up to a million Arab tourists a year with new visa-free accords concluded with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Iranians are automatically issued Turkish visas at their port of call. Turkish popular culture products such as soap operas have long been a staple in Arab countries and also increasingly in the Balkans. Growing interdependence reinforces the policy of rapprochement with Iran and Syria, which was long seen as a security threat. In April 2010, Turkey and Syria – which came to the brink of war in 1998 – conducted a three-day joint military exercise, much to the dismay of the Israeli defence establishment. These are just the two facets in an overall neighbourhood policy that extends more widely, to south-east Europe and the Caucasus (see box).

Figure 12 *Turkey's neighbourhood policy: political and economic initiatives*

MIDDLE EAST	
Iran	Turkey launched with Brazil an initiative to enrich Iranian uranium abroad. Voted against a new round of sanctions in the UN Security Council.
Iraq	Ahmet Davutoğlu made a landmark visit to Erbil in the Kurdish Autonomous Region of northern Iraq in October 2009. A consulate was opened in 2010. Turkey has attempted to mediate in talks over the formation of a government coalition in Baghdad following the March 2010 elections.
Syria	Turkey mediated between Israel and Syria until the invasion of Gaza in late 2008. In 2010, it negotiated a visa-free regime with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Joint military exercises.
Israel/Palestine	Turkey mediates between Hamas and Fatah. Turkey presses the Israeli government to relax the siege on Gaza but has not vetoed Israel's accession to OECD or military cooperation with NATO.
Multilateral	In August 2010, Turkey signed a free-trade agreement with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan extending previous bilateral deals.
SOUTHERN CAUCASUS	
	In the wake of the war in Georgia, Turkey proposed a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. In October 2009, after prolonged negotiations, Turkey and Armenia signed a package of protocols to normalize relations and re-open the border. The agreement is still not ratified by Ankara and may also be unilaterally revoked under Armenian law. A gas sales and transit deal was concluded with Azerbaijan in August 2010, which is instrumental for the Nabucco project.
RUSSIA	
	In July 2010, the two countries announced the abolition of visas. A deal was signed to construct a nuclear power plant at Mersin.
WESTERN BALKANS	
	Since October 2009, Turkey holds trilateral summits with Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia at foreign ministers and presidents level. Davutoğlu mediated over the appointment of a Bosnian ambassador to Belgrade, which facilitated the Serbian parliament's apology for the Srebrenica massacre, issued in April 2010. During Erdoğan's visit to Belgrade in July 2010, Turkey and Serbia signed deals on visa-free travel and Turkish companies' involvement in key road infrastructure projects. Serbian national carrier JAT might be purchased by Turkish Airways. Turkey mediates between rival groups in the Muslim-populated Serbian region of Sandžak. A visa-free travel pact was signed with Kosovo in January 2009.
EU MEMBERS IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE	
	Turkish and Greek cabinets held a meeting in May 2010. Joint sessions will be institutionalized. Exploratory talks on disputes in the Aegean have been restarted. In January 2010, Turkish and Bulgarian energy ministers agreed to make existing gas pipeline reversible and let Sofia participation in the LNG terminals on Turkey's Aegean coast.

Turkey and the multipolar Europe

Turkey's neighbourhood policy is now enabling it to become, alongside the EU and Russia, a pole in the emerging multipolar Europe. In the process, Turkish foreign policy has in effect emulated the EU. For decades, Turkey has relied primarily on hard power: Ankara used its considerable military muscle unilaterally across borders on a number of occasions in Cyprus (1974), in northern Iraq and very nearly against Greece (1996) and Syria (1998). But today Turkey deploys economic and soft-power resources as well as hard power. What is more, Turkey's economic engagement with neighbours would not have been possible without the advanced level of its economic integration with western Europe. (Though its share has dropped, the EU is still overwhelmingly Turkey's largest trade partner, accounting for 42.9 per cent. In fact, Spain (4.2 per cent) is a more important partner of Turkey than is Iran (2.2 per cent) or the Arab Levantine states (1.2 per cent)).

Thus the Turkish leadership sees its regional liaisons not as an alternative to the EU but as its version of the special relationships enjoyed by the UK with the Commonwealth or by Spain with Latin America. For example, as he opened a consulate in Erbil, a town in Iraqi Kurdistan, Davutoğlu declared that Turkey was Iraq's gateway to the EU. At the same time, Turkey's policies are in a sense closer to Beijing rather than Brussels: minimal interference in domestic politics and pragmatism remain the guiding principles. Thus, from the perspective of the less than democratic regimes that are in power in much of the contested neighbourhood, TNP has a major advantage over the ENP: it does not have to strike a difficult balance between the quest for stability and the commitment to a normative model. The AKP talks to very disparate regimes, avoids criticising anyone's democratic record or indeed lecturing on the relationship between state and faith, which is and will always remain a divisive topic inside Turkey.

As Turkey has become more active in its neighbourhood, its relationship with Russia has also changed. The two countries differ in many ways. Unlike Russia, Turkey is a democracy (albeit still a troubled one), a NATO ally and an EU candidate. But although its domestic orientation and its structural relationship with the EU could not be more different from Moscow, the sense of being let down by the West, which is shared across the political spectrum, has brought Turkey and Russia – and in particular Erdoğan and Putin – closer. This new relationship between Russia and Turkey is, like Turkey's neighbourhood policy, based not on ideological compatibility but on pragmatic calculations based on converging economic and strategic interests. As ties in energy, trade, investment and tourism

deepen, the security philosophies of the two countries are also increasingly aligned. For example, both Turkey and Russia want to keep the US away from the Black Sea.²²

Trade between Moscow and Ankara is currently valued at \$15.3 billion and leaders have pledged to boost it to \$100 billion within the next five years. Russia became Turkey's second biggest single trading partner in 2008 (11.3%) and remained so in 2009 after the economic turmoil began (9.5%). This is largely due to energy imports: Turkey receives nearly two-thirds of its gas and oil from Russia. The Russian market also now accounts for nearly a quarter of the business of Turkish construction companies. Russia has received \$17 billion of Turkish investment and nearly three million of its citizens visit Turkey each year. Once divided by a rivalry as old as the reign of Peter the Great, Turkey and Russia now see one another as strategic partners. During the state visit to Ankara of President Medvedev in May 2010, the two countries unveiled a \$20 billion plan to build Turkey's first nuclear power plant in Mersin. The plant will be constructed by the Russian state holding company Rosatom, which will remain the owner once the station is in place.

However, the relationship between Turkey and Russia is far from trouble-free. Turkey's overwhelming dependence on Russian energy imports is a strong incentive for Ankara to look for other suppliers and, by implication, reduce Russia's clout in European energy diplomacy. The recent gas deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan is clearly a step in that direction. (On the other hand, the Mersin nuclear plant will increase Turkey's dependency on Russia.) There is also potential for conflict around Turkey's involvement in the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute about Nagorno-Karabakh and President Gül's criticism of the Minsk Group, in which Russia is a principal player.

The newly activist Turkish foreign policy is likely to continue for the foreseeable future regardless of which party is in power, because it reflects the country's geopolitical and economic position as well as its changing domestic politics. The security challenges facing Turkey and the increased role of the public in foreign-policy making – a lasting legacy of democratisation in the 1990s and 2000s – suggest that there will be a degree of continuity in Turkish external relations whoever is in government in Ankara. Turkey's post-Kemalist foreign policy, its

²² For an in-depth analysis of the Russo-Turkish alignment, see *The Anatomy of Russian-Turkish Relations* (Brooking Institution, 2006). The analysis was written by Suat Kınıklıoğlu, a senior AKP member who is also the spokesman of the Turkish parliament's foreign affairs committee.

neighbourhood policy and its role in the emerging multipolar Europe are the product of systemic power shifts in Europe and the Middle East. If Europe's security architecture does not recognise and respond to this new reality, there is a danger that it will encourage Russia and Turkey to form an 'axis of the excluded'.

Chapter 5:

Post-European America

The latest chapter in America's involvement in European security was epitomised by a non-event: President Obama's decision to skip the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall because, as his spokesperson explained, he quite simply had other more important places to be. His absence from the celebration was a powerful metaphor for the shift of the US to the role of offshore balancer in Europe.

For half a century, the single most important security factor on the continent of Europe was the US security guarantee to its European allies. While that guarantee remains firmly in place, its importance has progressively diminished and, with it, the once reflexive assumption of Euro-Atlantic solidarity. As Europeans find it increasingly hard to discern any credible military threat to their continent, and Americans focus increasingly on emerging global powers and problems, so a progressive distancing between the security interests and preoccupations of the two sides of the Atlantic is inevitably underway. The process, though hardly deliberate on either side, has like everything else to do with the Atlantic alliance, been US-led.

Many have looked to Barack Obama's biography to explain Washington's lack of interest in Europe. However, this disengagement from Europe's internal security issues did not begin with the current US president, and actually reflects structural changes in the world that have reduced Europe's centrality to American strategy. It could be argued that when President George W Bush effectively sub-contracted the resolution of the Georgian crisis to President Sarkozy, he was signalling the end of the era where Americans regarded European security as too important to be left to Europeans. Obama's election in November 2008, on the back of the near-collapse of the global financial system, coincided with the emergence of a widespread sense in Washington that the shift in global power is creating a 'post-American world' – one in which the US

must adapt itself to the altogether more complicated role of *primus inter pares*. In response, America's grand strategy has been to try to build a new network of partnerships that will allow the US to remain the indispensable nation in the new era. This overarching strategy is based on two central preoccupations. On the one hand, Obama wants to re-order global institutions to bring in emerging powers and make them responsible stakeholders. On the other hand, quite apart from the financial crisis, he aims to solve or contain global problems such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and the Middle East conflict. In this new era, the US approach to each of the main poles on the European continent is shaped by how far they can help him achieve these goals.

A decade ago, many of the tensions in the relationship between the EU and the US stemmed from two contradictory American fears: that Europe was weak and ineffective; and that, because of the ambition of some Europeans to create an autonomous security identity, it could emerge as a competitor. However, now that the Soviet Union has ceased to exist and the Balkans have been pacified, Europe is no longer a major security concern to Americans. Where some EU policymakers previously aspired to counter-balance American hegemony, they now fear that Europe is becoming invisible in American strategic thinking. When the pragmatic Obama administration does think about Europe, it asks whether it could become more of a resource for solving global problems. The first shared experience – Obama's April 2009 visit to Europe for a NATO summit – was disillusioning; Europeans responded with little more than rhetoric on Washington's key priorities of Afghanistan and Guantànamo. The president may have been appreciative of the efforts of those Europeans who between them contribute 32,000 troops (26 per cent of the total) to the mission in Afghanistan, but he had no hesitation in subsequent months to effectively Americanise its command; first General McChrystal and then General Petraeus were imposed with virtually no consultation in NATO.

Europe's loss of influence is also illustrated by the fact that, while the US and EU have worked closely together on Iran, the final discussions on Resolution 1929 took place between China and the United States in a G2 format. Meanwhile, there has been no serious attempt to agree a common Western strategy on the question of recasting the global order. In fact, the main concern of the Obama administration is to "recognise the realities of changes to the global order" – diplomatic code for reducing Europe's over-representation so that room can be made for India, Brazil and other emerging powers. Obama administration officials point out, for example, that the G20 in fact has 24 seats around the table, nine of which are occupied by Europeans. Such is American frustration with the

EU that Obama administration officials describe the process of persuading the president to attend an EU-US summit as “like pulling teeth”. “It is fair to say”, says a US state department official diplomatically, “that Europe gets relatively less attention than it used to”.²³

The reset and the crash

As the US withdraws from Europe, American attitudes to Russia and Turkey have also been changing. Although the US shares many of Europe’s concerns about the return of spheres of influence in Europe, and some senior figures in Washington retain a particular interest in the situation in Georgia or Ukraine, these have clearly not been priorities for the White House or state department in their contacts with Moscow. “We look at Russia as part of our global policy rather than our European policy,” says an administration official about Obama’s approach to Russia.²⁴ In fact, Obama’s ‘reset diplomacy’ is explicitly designed around the idea of ‘compartmentalisation.’ Moscow and Washington have ‘agreed to disagree’ on the near-abroad issues precisely to avoid them spilling over into the global issues such as Afghanistan, Iran, and disarmament that are at the top of the administration’s agenda.

Even where “near-abroad” issues have arisen – such as the situation in Kyrgyzstan – the focus of the Obama administration has been on their impact on global issues. Thus the priority of the US is to keep its Manas airbase open and able to support the campaign in Afghanistan, regardless of the nature of the Kyrgyz government. As a result, one official explains that “there is nothing in the reset which has allowed us to make headway on Georgia or even Transdnistria or the Balkans”.²⁵ The reset diplomacy is often cited as one of the big successes of Obama’s foreign policy and the American president is said to talk more to his Russian counterpart than to any other leader. However, the reset is likely to come under pressure. The START treaty is unlikely to be ratified by Congress, and Republicans may well attack the administration for ‘selling out’ eastern Europe. Relations with Moscow are seen as important enough to have strategic value – but no longer important enough for political figures to treat it responsibly.

²³ Interview with the authors, August 2010.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

If the US's relationship with Russia has been reset, its relations with Turkey have crashed.²⁶ Turkey, as outlined in Chapter 4, no longer sees itself as a vassal of the United States or a supplicant of the EU. The Turks still want a security relationship, but no longer reflexively align themselves with western policy. The sense in Washington is that Turkey feels that the US needs its help more than the other way round. The US disagrees and now wants Turkey to realise how much it depends on US support on Iraq (and the Kurds); for the nuclear umbrella vis-à-vis the Russians; and for the realisation of their ambitions to become an energy hub. When Foreign Minister Davutoğlu went to Washington in June 2010, his team were refused entry to the White House by security officials and their meeting with US officials had to take place in a nearby hotel. This episode illustrates the growing mistrust between the two countries.

The neglect of NATO

With the EU member states disappointing, the Turks frustrating and the Russians more important as partners than as opponents, Americans now struggle to interest themselves much in NATO. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates' aforementioned expression of concern over the perceived "demilitarisation" of Europeans was followed by a decision to scrap the US Joint Forces Command (JFOC), which collaterally undermines the Bush-era restructuring of NATO. The latter, agreed at NATO's Prague summit in 2002, had centred on the establishment of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) – headquartered from 2004 alongside JFCOM at Norfolk, Virginia – to act as a conduit to Europe of US strategic and military thinking. The hope was to pull Europeans up to US standards, and strengthen the ability of all allies to operate together. However, ACT now finds itself stranded on the wrong side of the Atlantic.

Similarly, the lack of American input in the NATO new Strategic Concept exercise has been striking to everyone involved. There has been no serious US effort at senior levels to engage Europeans in real discussion about shared goals, or how the organisation might be refitted for purpose after the damage it has sustained in Afghanistan. Instead, the US seems content with a 'care and maintenance' approach. Obama responded promptly to central and eastern European complaints about a perceived second-class status within the alliance by pushing for new defence plans and exercises that would underline the strength of the

collective-security guarantee to the new members. No space would be left for the diminishing importance of the American guarantee to Europe to transmute into doubts about its underlying validity – doubts which could themselves undermine the continent’s unprecedented condition of stability and security. Similarly, the Europeans could benefit from a redesigned, regional missile defence, if they were prepared to pay for it – though the real policy drivers here were the Russian ‘reset’ and pre-empting Iran. But, beyond that, the US seems to have given up much ambition for NATO; the Albright group’s call for “dynamic engagement” – the western allies consulting together on shared security concerns and acting as one – seems unlikely to resonate much beyond the production of a new strategic concept all can endorse.

Thus, seen from Washington, Europe is no longer a security concern; and the Obama administration is prepared to do the minimum necessary to keep things that way. But, equally, neither the European allies nor the EU have anything much, apart from basing facilities, that they are prepared to offer. As neither a liability nor an asset, Europe has largely ceased to feature in American security accounts. Whoever is in charge in Washington, the two sides of the Atlantic will continue to find their views aligned on many, perhaps most, of the security challenges they face; but they will no longer do so as complementary parts of one unified, Euro-Atlantic community.

Yet if America’s shift to offshore balancing has alarmed many Europeans, it could – paradoxically – help the emergence of a legitimate European order in which America is present. One of the merits of Obama’s ‘reset’ diplomacy is that it legitimates the US role as a guarantor of European security. But the signal coming from Washington is that however vital these moves are to renew the relationship in relation to *global* issues, they will not help to resolve the strategic tensions that have emerged between European powers *within* their own continent.

Chapter 6:

The order that could be

Europe is in limbo. A change in the global balance of power is dramatically affecting its security, its influence in world affairs and its internal constitutional arrangements. As political attention flows from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Europe risks being transformed from a centre of geopolitics into a periphery whose welfare depends on decisions taken elsewhere (reversing a trend that started five centuries ago when Europe became the centre of the modern world). In these circumstances, it is in the interests of all of Europe's major powers to find order amongst themselves so that they have a solid foundation from which to engage with the rest of the world.

The quest to enhance the security of Europe is already underway. EU member states should build on the positive momentum of America's reset diplomacy and Russia's new *Westpolitik* by supporting Russia's inclusion in the US-initiated common missile defence shield. This would cement the European continent's security identity and define NATO as a key security guarantor when it comes to global threats directed against any of Europe's states (including the EU, Turkey, Russia and the neighbourhood). While it seems unrealistic for the moment to expect Russia to join NATO, an institutionalised NATO-Russia strategic partnership is a good alternative.

However, EU member states are still avoiding the difficult issue of how to guarantee security in Europe. While both Turkey and Russia have expressed a desire for new European institutions, it is the EU – whose member states have chosen to defend their security by agreeing norms and institutions rather than relying on military power – that stands to gain the most from re-legitimising the institutions of European security. The EU therefore has a particular interest in engaging in a genuine discussion on the fundamental nature and the institutions of the future European order. It should go beyond its policy of defensive engagement through the OSCE and flesh out a vision that is attractive not just to EU member states but to others in the European space.

The concert of projects

The new European order cannot simply be a return to a ‘concert of powers’ in which the EU, Russia and Turkey draw territorial or functional red lines around the states in their respective neighbourhoods in an attempt to avoid conflict between major powers. The challenge facing Europe today is to show how the continent’s new, vulnerable and mutually dependent state-building projects can live together in harmony. In this vision, the management of interdependence should replace the balance of power as the soul of the new European order.

Interdependence is the major trend of the globalised world, and of the new Europe. It is at the core of the EU’s view of security, which is based on mutual interdependence. But interdependence has also a dark side that was exposed during the current economic crisis, in which some countries became victims of the economic decisions taken by others. While traditionally European states have been threatened by the strength of their neighbours, the weakness and collapse of their neighbours now presents an equally serious threat.

Developing a foreign policy rooted in interdependence challenges traditional thinking about security. Where, in the balance of power, the focus is on understanding the intentions of other powers and building the military capacity to deter them, defenders of security in an age of interdependence must focus instead on creating the right incentives to shape the behaviour of other powers in line with their own interests. In this case, it means that the EU should give its partners enough of a stake in the new security order that they feel they have something to lose from working unilaterally or acting as spoilers within the current system.

Instead of an anachronistic ‘concert of powers’, the EU should aim to develop a ‘concert of projects’ – a way of breathing life into multilateral arrangements for discussing and managing the continent’s security in the interests of all. Rather than limiting its strategy to transforming all the nations of Europe into EU member states or re-establishing a balance of power, the new European order should be designed to help Europe’s state-building projects live together in peace. This means enhancing the effectiveness of the EU, consolidating Russia’s post-imperial identity in its current borders, encouraging Turkey’s ambition to be a regional power with global impact but integrating Ankara’s activity into a common framework, and stimulating the integration of the western Balkans into the EU and helping to build functioning states on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Principles of a new approach

The EU has the most to lose from a Europe that lives in peaceful disorder. It should therefore put the building of this order at the centre of its security agenda and go beyond its policy of defensive engagement through the OSCE. In order to promote a vision that is attractive to Turkey and Russia, the EU should be open to the creation of new treaties and institutions. However, it should stress that such treaties should be signed and such institutions built from the bottom up rather than the top down. In other words, they should come at the end of a process of confidence building and cooperation on shared policy goals. In our view, the new European order should meet three key objectives:

- to preserve and reinvigorate the normative base on which the current European institutions function (the Paris Charter of 1990 and the Istanbul Charter of 1999), thus allowing for the peaceful and gradual opening and modernisation of non-democratic regimes in Europe
- to decrease the risks of violence on the continent by solving frozen conflicts, thus reconfirming transparency and interdependence as pillars of European security and demilitarizing Europe's periphery, in particular the Caucasus
- to institutionalise the EU as the key security actor on the continent and enable it to use the range of tools it has at its disposal to deal with the threats its member states face.

Three elements of order

We believe that the best way for the EU to achieve these goals is through initiating an informal security dialogue between the EU, Turkey and Russia. Although there are bilateral channels established with both Russia and Turkey, we believe that these will not be enough to re-legitimate the European order. In fact, both the new partnership for modernisation with Russia and the ongoing accession talks with Turkey are more likely to succeed if they are anchored in a bigger security framework. We think that this trilateral approach is the only way to serve the interests of all the main players in Europe without reverting to an old-fashioned competition between different poles. It should be based on three elements:

A European security triologue

Rather than setting up a new institution, the EU should call for the creation of a regular informal European security triologue that would build on the Merkel-Medvedev idea of an EU-Russia security dialogue but expand it to include Turkey. The triologue – which would bring together Europe’s major security powers in the same way that the G20 convenes the world’s economic ones – could meet regularly to discuss the major security issues in our continent and the overlapping neighbourhoods of its central players. These include anything from ethno-national conflicts to energy cut-offs. The core members of the triologue would be the EU, Russia and Turkey (until it becomes an EU member state). The triologue could operate at summit level, the level of foreign ministers and at the level of officials, and it should also be flexible enough to allow other relevant players to take part. For example, it would make sense to involve Ukraine on Transnistria and Azerbaijan on energy security. The secretary-generals of NATO, the CSTO or OSCE could also be asked to take part in relevant discussions. The US could also take part as a permanent observer. This triologue would work to implement the agreements that the major powers have signed up to in the Paris and Istanbul charters as well as their commitments in other institutions such as the Council of Europe. The creation of the triologue would make it necessary for the EU to have a strategic discussion and give its representatives in the triologue a clear mandate.

A European security action plan

The first task of the triologue should be to elaborate an action plan for reducing tensions on the European continent. This could include a number of goals, including reducing the threat of destabilization of Europe’s periphery by demilitarization of the most volatile regions and solving frozen conflicts that remain the major source of insecurity. The solution of these frozen conflicts should be made a precondition for signing any new treaty (see below). This would allow the EU to test both Russia’s and Turkey’s willingness to become stakeholders in European security. Making progress towards a treaty conditional on the resolution of the frozen conflicts might change the current situation in which Russian foreign-policy makers see their country’s interests best served by keeping the conflicts unresolved. Equally, the EU could appeal to Turkey’s ambitions by trying to enlist Ankara’s soft power as a force for regional reconciliation in places like Bosnia and the Caucasus.

A European security treaty

Although EU leaders are right to be suspicious about the benefits of negotiating a treaty before Russia has shown itself willing to make progress on the many pressing security challenges on the European continent, EU member states would have much to gain from a new treaty – if, that is, it comes at the end of a

process of confidence-building. It is a key EU interest that any future treaty on European security architecture will have the EU itself as a major signatory together with Russia, Turkey and the other European states. Now that the EU's common foreign policy has been embedded in the EU institutions with the creation of an EU foreign minister and an EU diplomatic corps, it is high time for the EU to be institutionalised as a key security actor in Europe, which would enable it to use the range of tools it has at its disposal to deal with the threats its member states face. This trilateral approach would be good for the EU because it would endorse the Russian idea of a new security architecture but replace futile attempts at treaty-writing with concrete efforts to resolve current tensions, working towards finality on borders in Europe and creating guarantees against its changes. As we have seen, it could also reinforce some of the positive aspects of President Medvedev's proposal – namely Russia's acceptance of the US as a European power and NATO's role on the continent. At the same time, such an approach would recognise the EU's role as a central anchor for security on the European continent, thus ending the current anomalous situation in which only individual member states are represented. The EU's engagement in a security trialogue would also provide a powerful impetus to have a genuine strategic debate among member states about what kind of order the EU should be promoting.

Russia, meanwhile, would see the EU's engagement with the new security architecture as a recognition of its relevance as a European power at a moment when the European continent as a whole risks being marginalised. The trialogue would be a tangible, high-profile response to the Medvedev proposal. It would meet Russia's interest in creating a forum to discuss hard security issues but the trilateral format would reduce the Cold War flavour of the EU-Russia dialogue by bringing Turkey in. Russia would also welcome the chance to negotiate a legitimate security order before its relative decline really sets in. The strategic discussion should reduce the risks of rapid changes in Russia's foreign policy and should give the modernization partnership between Europe and Moscow a better chance.

The trialogue should also help the EU develop its strategic cooperation with Turkey at a very risky moment when Turkey is losing confidence in the sincerity of the accession process and when short-sighted European leaders labour under the delusion that never-ending negotiations are the best form of the privileged partnership they have always been dreaming of. The trialogue would not only recognise Turkey's role as a rising power but also begin to provide an anchor for Turkish foreign-policy activism. It is important to stress, however, that upgrading Turkey in this way should not be viewed as the way to compensate for keeping Turkey out of the EU. Rather, accession negotiations with Turkey would continue

to take place alongside the trialogue. It would make sense to use the establishment of the trialogue as an occasion to open chapters on energy security and CSDP. In fact, we believe that this would be a way to convince the European public of Turkey's importance to the future of the EU. When Turkey becomes a member of the EU, the trialogue would simply become a dialogue between the EU and Russia.

Finally, this trilateral approach could be attractive for the newly independent states in Europe's periphery. It would create new mechanisms for addressing some of the existential challenges that they face, such as frozen conflicts and energy disputes. Because it would be an informal structure which the leaders of neighbouring countries could be invited to join on issues where they have particular interests, it would reassure them that their sovereignty was being taken seriously. This would shape a context in which states that are unlikely to be EU members in the near future would have a stake in a broader Europe.

The prize

The dilemma facing the European Union in its own continent is somewhat similar to that faced by the US at a global level. The EU can do little to prevent Europe's evolution from a unipolar to a multipolar order; but it can do a lot to shape the relations between its emerging poles. The current approach of relying on bilateral relations with Moscow and Ankara might prop up existing institutions for a few more years, but it is in danger of leading to increased competition between great powers on the one hand whilst creating a zone of instability between the poles on the other. It also risks squandering an exciting political opening created by Moscow's desire to modernise and Turkey's search for a regional role. Under these circumstances, the EU needs a new strategic approach that aims not simply to guarantee peace but to facilitate the successful consolidation of the four projects that have shaped Europe in the last two decades. The approach we propose would be the first step towards creating a trilateral rather than a tripolar Europe: a new institutional order in the continent that (to paraphrase Lord Ismay) keeps the EU united, Russia post-imperial and Turkey European.

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