Briefed was the latest situation in Iraq and the government’s efforts in implementing its program, including: meeting the demands of youth, and stressing that the reform process pursued by Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi is proceeding effectively, and will achieve the desired goals with the cooperation of all. Minister Alhakim praised the support provided by the Dutch side to Iraq in confronting Da’esh terrorist gangs within the framework of the Global Coalition, stressing the importance of continuing the training of Iraqi military forces. The two sides discussed benefiting from the Dutch experiences in the field of oil, agriculture and water, which positively reflects on job creation and development in Iraq. A number of regional and international issues of mutual interest were also discussed. Minister Alhakim stressed the importance of restraint to peaceful solutions and calmness, stating that the escalation in the region will not serve any side.

Developing a profound understanding of factors that influence Iraq’s future as a nation requires going beyond current affairs such as the siege of Mosul or the political role of Iraq’s popular irregular forces (the Hashd al-Shabi). It necessitates analysis of the heart of political power in Iraq and this means focusing on historical and contemporary socio-political manifestations of Shi’ism. It is for this reason that the report analyses the dynamics of relation- and coalition-building between the country’s main Shi’a political groups from 1991 to 2016. It focuses mostly on the Islamic Da’wa Party, the Sadrist Trend, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Iraq’s various irregular forces. It finds that Shi’a political relation- and coalition-building can be characterized as follows:

• Iraq’s Shi’a are far from a unified political force despite their shared belief. Instead, their political parties compete viciously with each other, using all means imaginable.
• Historical legacies and the role/quality of leaders dominate political party development.
• There is a high degree of continuity of individual Shi’a leaders and elites in Iraq’s governance at the level of the central state.
• Coalitions between Shi’a parties have been unstable, ad hoc affairs aimed at winning the vote, carving up public authority and resources, and/or responding to an imminent threat.
• Religion-based political influence is strong on issues on which the Shi’a community is united, but limited on issues on which it is not.
• Shi’a political parties unite temporarily in the face of an external threat, especially if called upon by their religious leadership, but this tends to be short-lived and does not reduce opportunistic political behaviour.

These findings point to two broad problems for Iraq’s future as a nation. First, few channels exist outside of the existing political establishment to manifest grievances and discontent that arise from significant levels of poor governance, insecurity, poverty and inadequate service delivery. This risks storing up socio-political unrest for the future as the political establishment is not necessarily held in high regard by ordinary Iraqis. The quasi-permanence of the cast of Shi’a characters and parties that dominate political competition in Baghdad has discouraged new political entrants, creating a relatively ‘closed’ political marketplace. In consequence, the rejuvenation of the Shi’a body politic has been very limited despite the fact that many of the existing leaders have a distinctly underwhelming track record in terms of their public service performance.

Cyrus Cylinder

A clay cylinder covered in Akkadian cuneiform script, damaged and broken, the Cyrus Cylinder is a powerful symbol of religious tolerance and multi-culturalism. In this enthralling talk Neil MacGregor, Director of the British Museum, traces 2600 years of Middle Eastern history through this single object.

Much of the attention of the international community is currently focused on combating the Islamic State and promoting reconciliation between Iraq’s Sunni, Shi’a and Kurds. These are worthwhile goals. This report suggests that the international community also needs to focus on promoting change in the quality, legitimacy and diversity of political representation of Iraq’s Shi’a, if only to enhance its wider reconciliation efforts. On the one hand, this will need to be done via existing political parties and their leadership because of their dominant position. On the other hand, it will need to be done outside of these very same parties and their leadership because of their dominant position. This is not a contradiction, but a reflection of the fact that change will require complementary political initiatives from inside and from outside Iraq’s political system. From this perspective, the report makes four recommendations with the caveat that external actors will not be able to drive any of them. Nevertheless, they can provide discreet and indirect support with modesty and humility:

Working with existing political parties and their leadership

1. Support efforts at political confidence-building and reconciliation between Iraq’s Shi’a political groups.
2. Stimulate a greater level of informal, open and confidential exchange between Iraq’s Shi’a political leadership on possible futures for the country.

Working outside of existing political parties and their leadership

3. Provide long-term support to Shi’a social movements, civil society advocacy groups and nascent political parties.
4. Encourage a civic awareness campaign that raises citizens’ understanding of the role of political parties in an emergent democracy.