Pakistan 2020. Professor Michael Oppenheimer presented and discussed on scenarios and policy implications. What will Pakistani politics and security look like in 2020? That question was the topic of a Feb. 24 presentation at the EastWest Institute’s New York Center by a team of experts convened by New York University’s Center for Global Affairs. Led by Prof. Michael F. Oppenheimer, the team presented its Pakistan 2020 report, which explores three possible future scenarios for the country. The event connected participants in the United States, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Pakistan to weigh in on prospects for Pakistan’s future over the course of the next decade.

Oppenheimer’s colleagues included: Shamila Chaudhary, an analyst for Eurasia Group who served as the director for Pakistan and Afghanistan at the National Security Council from 2010-2011; Pakistan 2020 team lead for the CGA Scenarios Initiative Rorry Daniels; and Regina Joseph, who wrote up one of the scenarios for the report. The Carnegie Corporation-funded project was the result of NYU’s Pakistan Scenarios workshop held on April 29, 2011, which brought together 15 expert participants to develop three “plausible, distinct and consequential scenarios that merit the attention of U.S. foreign policy makers. Each scenario for Pakistan in 2020, though hypothetical, was designed to produce policy insights through considering potential futures.

The first hypothetical scenario, “radicalization,” envisions a Pakistan consumed by populist fervor as a result of “perceived military threats, spiraling economic losses and political infighting.” This results in the rise of a democratically elected conservative military officer who pursue a radical Islamic agenda for the country.
The second scenario, “fragmentation,” foresees economic instability as crippling the capacity of the state to govern, leading to a federally and regionally unstable Pakistan rife with insecure nuclear materials
The third and most optimistic scenario, “reform,” sees a growing middle class fostering a centrist, economically oriented political movement. A political party born out of this movement then serves to displace much of the power currently held by political and military elites.

While the third scenario may be the least likely to occur, Oppenheimer said, “it is sufficiently plausible for the U.S. to try to work toward that scenario, in part because the other two … involve significant risks and damage to American interests and American security.”

Chaudhary argued that balkanization in Pakistan was unlikely. She maintained that Pakistan should instead be expected to “muddle through” current challenges. The first and third scenarios, both of which heavily rely upon the democratic process, would seem to support her view that Pakistan’s military, media, political parties and religious organizations are an example of “democracy at its best and at its worst.”

Najam Abbas, a senior fellow at the EastWest Institute who called in from London, commented that the situation requires a “macro-layer of analysis to probe the implications of Pakistan's 64-year-long [history of] a chaotic polity and shaky economy,” and aspects that “lead us to triggers that perpetuated strong individuals but weaker institutions.”

EWI Board Member Ikram Sehgal, speaking from Pakistan where he is chairman of a private security company, said pervasive corruption in Pakistan’s institutions was “the most important issue to the people of Pakistan” and a major cause of current instability.

German Ambassador calling in from Brussels, argued that corruption in Pakistan was in fact “a symptom of poor governance, not a cause.”


Musharraf: Afghanistan Is 'Proxy Conflict' Between Pakistan and India. Click for a short video In Conversation with Pervez Musharraf, AIF 2012. In fact Pakistan has sufficient strength to stand on own feet.
2011, in Washington DC, Pervez Musharraf stated not to have been aware of the presence of O bin Laden in Pakistan. He also said that some kind of (legitimate) conflict is working, which is creating a conflict between India and Pakistan (India trains Afghan soldiers and tries to get Afghanistan among his sphere of influence).

It is a matter of attitude to Pakistan from the west. All parties have to come together (Taliban, Afghanistan, ...). We need to invest in this to find a way out and to take the weapons away. But what do we really know on what the region is thinking about? Pakistan faces many conflicting pressures in the coming decade. Not only will each driver of change interact with other drivers to produce a different Pakistan in 2020, but decision-making could be further complicated by forces outside of Pakistan's control; a major terrorist attack or natural disaster could change the course of Pakistan's development trajectory.

How will Pakistan manage competing interests, both natural & external? How will improvements in one driver compound improvements in others, or negatively affect others? Narratives for Pakistan to 2020 will incorporate all drivers - identity, political development, economics, security & foreign policy orientation for the development of the state.
14 March 2008 the lecture 'How to handle with Pakistan' was attended. Splits of president Musharraf came in front. It is a rather new country with a border of approximately 2200 km, an atomic power, with 165 million inhabitants, and fairly anti west. Geographically the country is jammed in between two not so by religion posessed Afghanistan and India.

West Pakistan houses many ethnic groups, allied by Islam. Pakistan is not to be seen aside from Afghanistan: Pashtuns are living in both countries and they desire independent territory. Pashtuns have a great influence in areas. There were and are tensions with Pakistan. In 1978 a communistic administration governed Pakistan.