Solidarity as attitude to life. In the organising world, Europe is living in social market economies, the main economic model used in Western and Northern Europe. The social market economy seeks a middle path between socialism and capitalism (i.e. a mixed economy) and aims at maintaining a balance between a high rate of economic growth, low inflation, low levels of unemployment, good working conditions, social welfare, and public services, by using state intervention. Basically respecting the free market, the social market economy is opposed to both a planned economy and laissez-faire capitalism.

Globalisation is an opportunity for economic and social progress and yet many citizens across the European Union apprehend it and tear its negative social impact. Solidarity and social rights are indivisible values on which the European Union is founded. Creating necessary conditions for citizens to make the most of the opportunities offered by globalisation, is therefore committed by policy makers and the Union.

Brussels, August 1, 2022, Paul N. Goldschmidt

What a magic word! It immediately arouses a warm feeling of belonging, benevolence, good conscience, commitment by encouraging the surpassing of oneself and implies a will to act towards a shared objective that transcends individual interests. A distinction must be made between its idealized form, which belongs more to the philosophical or religious spheres, and its pragmatic form, which concerns its implementation.
 
"Idealized" solidarity is thus interwoven with the confrontation of moral values or legal norms such as "good and evil", "individual versus collective rights", or even refers to ethical or religious precepts such as "do not do unto others what you would not like them to do to you", "love your neighbor as yourself" or the recital of the "Beatitudes", etc.
 
In its application this level of generality is rarely encountered as it often comes up against conflicts of interest or indifference; it can come close, however, when it is a question of confronting an event with a strong emotional charge for which it is difficult to establish a specific chain of responsibility between cause and effect. Until recently, this was particularly  the case for the solidarity that arose regularly from so-called "natural" disasters; however, since knowledge of global warming has identified their causes, they can now give rise to violent confrontations of interests that weaken the "solidarity" indispensable to overcome the urgent problem of dealing with this global challenge.
 
The same event can generate simultaneously solidarity, indifference or opposition. For  example, Ukraine, the undisputed victim of an unprovoked aggression, has aroused the "unanimous" solidarity of the EU; however, the latter is not only divided by opposing interests between Member States, but also by fractures within them where political parties, economic sectors and social classes pursue conflicting agendas. Similarly, at the global level, civilizational or cultural traditions as well as geostrategic or economic interests relegate solidarity - whether moral or legal - to a useful accessory for those who claim it, easily yielding to the demands of "real politiek" or the comfort of indifference (see the votes at the UN General Assembly).

To deserve the label of "solidarity", an action must be independent of - but not necessarily contrary to - the interests of those who support it. It is obvious that a conjunction between solidarity and interests - as in Ukraine - makes the action more appealing; it is in the identification and promotion of this conjunction that the exemplarity of the leaders, called upon to support such actions, lies.

The ramifications of the war in Ukraine have demonstrated its global effects, be they economic, financial, military, social or, more fundamentally, political and geostrategic:  major powers have now clearly stated as their priority, the establishment of a new world order based on their own authoritarian models. 

However, it should be manifest that any attempt to impose a new world order can only be based on the concept of "solidarity" in its most universalist sense.

1. to make sure that the auxiliary is used as effectively as possible, and
2. the help discourage the risk of moral hazard limit. And coordination is needed to certain risks or undesirable to reduce differences within the group.

The Maastricht Treaty provided for EMU solidarity mechanisms (the Fund) of coordination requirements (no excessive deficits) and a no bail-out clause to strengthen fiscal discipline. As is well known that discipline proved ineffective. That was partly undermined by financial markets for years hardly differed between the bonds of eurozone countries. This "piggybacking" of countries with high debt ratio would have a form of implicit call to solidarity - with the long term adverse effects.

After the outbreak of the crisis, the EU Member States and the Eurozone with the new emergency funds, not previously provided mechanisms for inter-state solidarity should create. They were thereby driven by enlightened self-interest: the prevention of further spread of the debt crisis. But the authors find that not a good diagnosis of the crisis was made because some system causes about being overlooked.

The first stems from the fact that the EMU debt issued in a currency which it does not have full control (a point which Paul de Grauwe previously noted). That makes a liquidity problem can quickly degenerate into a solvency problem.
The second system cause has to do with inadequate banking supervision at EU level. And actually, the political leaders not fulfilled their promise that they would do everything necessary to default by a Member State and breakup of the eurozone to avoid. The emergency funds are therefore not large enough and effective enough usable.

Fernandes and Rubio advocate the following forms of solidarity. In the short term is important because of enlightened self interest, the bond markets of EMU countries to stabilize and growth recovery in the peripheral EMU countries. For quick stabilization of the bond are two options: a massive intervention by the ECB (acting as lender of last resort would act) or the introduction of cross-guarantees by the Member States of the euro area in the context of Eurobonds . On balance it seems preferable to theauthors proceed to (a temporary system) Eurobonds. Previously, a group of ELEC (the European League of Economic Cooperation) recently proposed that in this study is not known but on the EBN website can be found.

How can growth recovery in the peripheral EMU countries be promoted? Structural reforms are therefore important, but these often take time to bear fruit. In the short term, additional growth impetus. Strong EMU countries would therefore not have to economize now. Furthermore, the access of peripheral countries to the available structural and cohesion funds should be increased (as in the AIV advisory letter to a strengthened financial and economic governance in the EU advocates).

In the short term aid - whether in the form of guarantees - badly. Who does not 'transfer union' will, to invest in a better policy coordination in EMU. That is the challenge for the longer term. To increase the resilience of EMU strengthening, do the authors propose a more effective use of structural and cohesion funds for a permanent system of Eurobonds for an EMU-wide insurance for bank deposits and a provision for the EMU is to be in exceptional circumstances to a joint commitment of budgetary resources.

Rightly, the study concludes that the European debt crisis, no magic, free solution has. The next time a special use of non-reciprocal solidarity necessary for EMU to bring back into safe waters. But apart from this crisis, the EMU needs to create mechanisms for solidarity - not a transfer union to create, but as mutual guarantee against risks.

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'Gold standard' for social investment in human capital must assume, based on a substantial expansion of cross-border programs for education and training. An annual investment of 40 to 50 billion (0.3 percent of GDP in the EU) would 4-5000000 cross 'placements' (full-and part-time) per year could bring. This would create a European labor market, with the necessary cross-border mobility can be encouraged. The training programs may all be directed at removing bottlenecks in labor markets. The authors find a strong commitment of the EU justified because of the significant external effects of education and training are linked. A subsidiarity test would such an EU policy eyes higher throw than the current agricultural policy. This interesting proposal of Rossi and Her deserves further elaboration and consideration.