Many linguistic families meet in the region, including the Slavic, Romans, Hellenic, Albanian, and Turkic language families, while the main religions are Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam.

The term "The Balkans" covers not only those countries which lie within the boundaries of the Balkan Peninsula, but may also include Slovenia and Romania. Prior to 1991 the whole of Yugoslavia was considered to be part of the Balkans.

At the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003, all of the EU’s member states declared their “unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries” and also that “the future of the Balkans is within the European Union”. Although the countries are not EU-members, the EU develops and put into effect policies, because the institutions recognise strong European Neighbourhood Policies.

Ahead of her visit to Belgrade, she released a statement in which she underlined the significance of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. “The importance of the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina is impossible to overstate, for regional stability as much as for Serbians and Kosovars,” she pointed out. She also tackled the issues with Serbian reforms, adding that Serbia needs “a stronger rule of law, a more predictable business environment and that the better services for all citizens would help create new jobs and attract more investments from abroad.”

European Council on Foreign Relations, commentary Francisco de Borja Lasheras & Vessela Tcherneva 05th August, 2015: No business as usual in the Western Balkans The Western Balkans remain Europe’s unfinished business, not only for the continuing stalemate in Bosnia or tensions in Macedonia and Northern Kosovo, but also because broader geopolitical developments shaping the EU’s neighbourhood are materialising in this region too - and in ways that could be detrimental to European interests.

That the “Pax Europeanna” is in question in the Western Balkans has been for some time now the subject of analysis by pundits and a matter of growing concern in some capitals. Yet, beyond ‘policy speak’ about “European re-engagement” or keeping enlargement alive, there seems to have been thus far precious little in terms of a purposeful, pan-European strategic discussion on what is the actual shape of these challenges and, importantly, what should Europeans do about them. These questions were tackled by a recent workshop in Sofia, with notable participation of Balkan think-tankers, journalists and analysts. The guest speakers included HR/VP Federica Mogherini, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Daniel Mitov and deputy Bulgarian PM Meglena Kuneva. More than 50 experts from the Balkans and the Black Sea region raised their concerns and offered policy suggestions.

What do local experts think?

Local experts argued that the EU is basically acting on policy autopilot, with an overwhelming focus on process (e.g. benchmark decision-making) and less on substance (e.g. actual progress on deep democratisation and good governance). The EU’s own internal struggles and negative politics with its Grexit and Brexits, together with the political chill resulting from the enlargement fatigue, have contributed to its losing leverage in the Western Balkans.

There is a sense that, at present, not only has momentum been lost but negative momentum has set in. We see democratic rollbacks across the region, outbursts of tensions (for instance, the controversy around the Srebrenica commemorations, magnified by Russia’s veto at the UN Security Council) and the resulting power vacuum gradually filled, in different ways, by Russia, Turkey, the Gulf countries or even China. Other experts argued that Europeans would be trading “democracy for stability” and even renouncing basic principles –with references to acceptance with undemocratic practices in Macedonia and elsewhere. Though regional initiatives, such as the Berlin Process, the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue and the EC-led Politcal agreement in Skopje, are sign of a certain re-engagement, experts showed scepticism towards these projects’ real capacity to be game-changers. This doubt is given more credence, given the regional tradition of undertaking power-sharing or reforms commitments that, in spite of much rhetoric and fanfare, are not honoured.

When it comes to stale dossiers such as Bosnia or the crisis of Macedonia, participants in the workshop argued for the EU to be more assertive, instead of just an incentive-based approach, to guarantee respect for agreements and reassurance against spoiler politics, tensions and zero-sum games.

A new European strategy for the Western Balkans?

Local experts overwhelmingly advocated for a reassessment of EU’s policies towards the region and, above all, to avoid current inertia, even if this were to see changes in the way forward. In their view, the EU and its member states would need a “new strategy” for the region. This strategy should be coherent with the ongoing process for a new EU Global Strategy. Such a strategy should follow, they argue, a policy reassessment based on lessons learned from scenarios like Kosovo or Macedonia. Moreover, the current autopilot mode on enlargement cannot continue. The EU should reverse a trend of disempowerment of democratic forces in the region, and shift course to enable a more inclusive, truly transformational process that would rely more heavily on civil society's role. The current emphasis on regional cooperation, socio-economics and governance is positive, but needs to be backed with real, tangible outcomes for the population and based on sustained implementation of reforms.

Overall, there is a sense that Europe needs to re-establish itself with regards to the Western Balkans and that, in the face of these challenges, more of the same will not suffice. The different strategic processes in the EU and some of its member states should be an opportunity for this policy reset or new strategy. Ultimately, as local experts suggested, the future of the Western Balkans is a question that fundamentally pertains to the kind of EU that Europeans really want and to the future of the European project itself. This is a question that Europeans can no longer dodge. And, for the Western Balkans, the sooner they answer it, the better, unless they want other global powers to pre-empt their answer.

The Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano was a treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed at the end of the Russo-Turkish War, 1877–78. Although according to the official Russian position, by signing the treaty, Russia had never intended anything more than a temporary rough draft, so to enable a final settlement with the other Great Powers, this preliminary treaty almost immediately became the central point of Bulgarian foreign policy, lasting until 1944 and leading to the Second Balkan War and Bulgaria's participation in World War I.

The treaty provided the creation of a Principality of Bulgaria as autonomous, after almost 500 years of Ottoman domination. The enlarged Bulgaria envisioned by the treaty alarmed neighboring states as well as France and Great Britain. As a result, it was never implemented, being superseded by the Treaty of Berlin following the Congress of the same name, a meeting of the leading statesmen of the European Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire, in Berlin in 1878. The meeting's aim was to reorganize the countries of the Balkans.