◄ | FOREIGN and SECURITY POLICY of the EU |
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The EU's foreign affairs are driven by its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and also through the Commission-led economic trade negotiations. The EU's chief diplomat, sometimes dubbed its foreign minister, the High Representative. Foreign policy is still largely the domain of the member-states however and there has been significant disagreement between members. The failure to present a common voice on the world stage has led to the EU being sidelined in international negotiations. Enlargement of the Union's membership is a major political issue, with division over how far the bloc should expand. While some see it as a major policy instrument aiding the Union's development, some fear over-stretch and dilution of the Union. On this page not only information about the main hurdles that the EEAS will have to clear before it reaches its full potential, knowledge of political guidelines and an impression from Parag Khanna on world politics and the role in that for the weight of the EU, but also attention for an EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy, reports on the MENA area, EU’s Strategic Partnership with Africa, the search for a robust EU-Russia policy by Poland, EU's Balkans operations to an EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy. This process gives us the opportunity to forge a stronger and more effective EU foreign policy and engage the public on debates about foreign policy. In today's world foreign policy is not just a question for experts – it affects all of us: from the food we eat and the clothes we wear to our daily security and the future prosperity of our children. This is why I believe it is important to involve all of you in our strategic reflection – to hear many voices and get different perspectives. Through the website EU Global Strategy I would like to have a broad conversation on the EU’s foreign policy interests, goals and means to achieve them'. |
Towards a more effective, |
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EEAS |
“The EU must confront both the challenges and the opportunities that come with its changed environment” Mogherini argues in the report. “The very nature of our Union gives us a unique advantage to steer the way in a more complex, more connected, but also more contested world.” The High Representative stressed that current global trends make it necessary for the EU to adapt and set out its course ahead: “The world is more connected than at any point in the past, the same is true for the European Union. An effective response hinges on the European Union's ability to make choices and prioritise areas where it can and wants to make a difference.”
The European Union does not have the luxury to turn inwards. We have a responsibility to protect our citizens while promoting our interests and universal values.” Mogherini argues in the report. To do this, it will be essential to work even more closely together at European level and with partners around the globe: The European Union has all the means to be an influential global layer in future – if it acts together. We need a common, comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy. We need to forge a new social contract with European citizens also through foreign policy.” Read here the strategic review. |
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The road back to European power |
The EU needs an honest assessment of its capabilities and to set limited goals behind which member states can show sustainable unity. “The road back to European power”, is published after the European Council’s green-light for stage two of Federica Mogherini’s global strategy review, a review that ECFR experts support and have long called for. They assert that the EU can still act effectively in protection of its interests and values -- provided that it is severely realistic in its approach. To this end, it recommends a strict prioritisation of the challenges Mogherini highlights in her report, with Russia and the Ukraine conflict and crises in the Middle East and North Africa as immediate priorities. To deal with the potential weaknesses of Europe’s internal dynamics of sometimes coinciding, sometimes clashing national interests, it recommends the creation of a group of member state representatives, who can act as an ‘intergovernmental convention’to map member state interests over the coming year.
The paper also recommends a number of key structural and political changes including: On the eastern neighbourhood and Russia, the paper recommends: On the Middle East and North Africa, the paper recommends: On Africa, the paper recommends Susi Dennison, co-author of “The road back to European power” and co-director of ECFR’s European Power programme, said: “In 2003, Europe was a success story, epitomised by the famous claim 'Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free'. The rest of the world seemed anxious to emulate us and liberal democracy looked set to spread around the globe. “In 2015, such optimism is a distant dream. Beset by economic and political travails, the EU and its member states have become anxious, and introverted. Crises burn on Europe’s borders and policy makers are increasingly aware how much global power has leached away from Europe. “Europe’s global strategy must reflect this new reality. We cannot go on as we have done, aspiring to a leading role and falling short of this when confronted with our new place in the international system. “Europe still has a strong range of tools at its disposal – diplomatic, developmental, security and economic – and the possibility of adding more military and cyber capabilities to its arsenal. But it will need all member states to come together, determine their shared priorities and assess the prospects for effective action in order for them to be properly deployed”. |
a renewed Common Foreign and Security Policy |
The Lisbon Treaty presents the possibility to harness foreign policy, including establishing of an External European Action Service (EEAS). In this connection the European Commission drafted in 2010, Political Guidelines a catalogue to
develop the guidelines into the more detailed programme and released CEPS in February 2013 the book 'The New EU Foreign Policy Architecture: Reviewing the first two years of the EEAS'. A systematic annual assessment of Europe’s performance in dealing with the rest of the world is the European Foreign Policy Scorecard. The scorecard assesses the performance of the 28 member states and the EU institutions on 79 policy areas arranged around the six key themes China, Russia, United States, wider Europe, Middle East & North Africa, multilateral issues.
Brussels Think Tank Dialogue 2014 discussed the policy. The economic crisis has soaked up attention during the last few years and in a rapidly changing world, the EU must constantly renew its foreign policy credentials or face irrelevance. Three key challenges were taken up in the field of foreign policy: (1) The momentum generated by the December summit on a Common Security and Defence Policy must be sustained and translated into political action, (2) EU relations with Asia, one of the world’s most dynamic regions, must be reviewed and revised, and (3) EU leadership changes in 2014 will provide an opportunity to address some fundamental challenges facing the Union’s foreign policy and overall external performance. The coherence and effectiveness of EU foreign policy could be substantially enhanced if there is better coordination between the (EEAS) and the external dimension of European Commission policies as well as improved collaboration between EU member states and the EEAS. |
Ukraine_Russia |
In November 2013, there was in the capital Kiev a protest movement in response following not signing an association agreement with the European Union. The Russian minded President Viktor Janoekovytsj fled in response to these protests to Russia. Meanwhile in Kiev a new government was formed, the government Jatsenjoek. In the predominantly Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine protests broke out against the new government, after which Russia occupied Crimean peninsula. On March 18, 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, despite heavy protests from including the USA and the EU.
CEPS Senior Research Fellow and Head of the EU Foreign Policy unit issued 25 July 2014 a policy brief on the need for more flexibility in EU foreign-policy-making in the case of Ukraine and Russia. After the illegal annexation of Crimea and Russia’s indirect responsibility for the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine, what will it take before the EU can effectively confront a conflict on its borders and prove to both its own citizens and third countries that it has a meaningful role to play in foreign policy?
CEPS Policy Briefs present concise, policy-oriented analyses of topical issues in European affairs. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which they are associated. Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu) © CEPS 2014. Centre for European Policy Studies▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu |
On EU foreign politics towards Russia |
Bruno Lété, a senior program officer for foreign and security policy with the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Brussels, wrote:
The European Union and Russia are set to meet on January 28, 2014 for their biannual summit. These events, usually box-ticking affairs, have rarely served as venues for honest debate about tough issues. But this time frustrations seem to have exceeded courtesies and the planned two-day summit has been cut to a restricted three-hour meeting. While relations between Europe and Russia have matured significantly in technical areas such as trade, energy, tourism, and education, Europeans were never prepared for Russian President Vladimir Putin plunging them into a vicious zero-sum game over the fate of Central and Eastern Europe. Europeans are angered at Russia’s role in dissuading post-Soviet states from seeking a rapprochement with Brussels. Russia’s probing of Europeans’ weaknesses, and Europe’s difficulties in dealing with it, has led to stagnation and much mistrust. Moscow’s assertive diplomatic use of energy security, punitive trade measures, moneylending, and military might has successfully weakened EU strategies aimed at offering greater economic integration with many post-Soviet states in return for good governance. And with plans in the making for a Eurasian Union between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and potentially also Ukraine, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, Putin might become even more successful at keeping Europe out of what he considers Russia’s legitimate sphere of influence. As a result, Europe’s eastern neighborhood is not transforming into a region of liberal, well-governed countries, but into a collection of economically weak nation-states ruled by semi-authoritarian regimes loyal to Moscow. Brussels’ response to this challenge has been minimal. But the EU is not completely to blame for being at risk of losing its East. The responsibility lies with the member states who have found it difficult to stick together and provide Brussels with the necessary tools to act like a serious geopolitical actor. In the long run, the failure to adopt a credible neighborhood policy will probably mean more difficulty in managing tensions with Russia. An immediate priority for European leaders should be taking a fresh look at how they deal with their eastern neighborhood. The Vilnius Summit last November gave the final blow to an EU policy that too closely followed the enlargement process without giving partner countries the prospect of actual EU membership. Moreover, the benefits that the EU offers in exchange for political reform are dwarfed by some of the sums pledged by Moscow to aid certain countries’ financial woes. But despite setbacks, the EU must make clear that it remains committed to the region’s modernization and development. An important signal would be to redesign and launch an updated Ostpolitik. Measures could range from helping countries diversify their sources of energy to opening up the European single market for specific products, without necessarily having to tie countries to a comprehensive trade agreement. Another priority is to keep pushing for socio-political change within Russia. Here Germany could play an invaluable role. Even as the cozy camaraderie between Berlin and Moscow has come to an end, Germany’s value-based foreign policy combined with its leading investment position in the Russian economy can help spur the modernization of Russian society and pressurize elites to respect civil rights and the rule of law. At the same time, Chancellor Angela Merkel should hold firm to her position that countries in Europe’s neighborhood must be able to decide about their own future. Germany has the strength to mobilize European support and resources to assist countries like Moldova and Georgia that seek to sail a more independent course from Moscow. In that respect, Germany will find committed allies in countries like Poland and Sweden that can help Berlin embed efforts into a wider EU strategy. Finally, the EU must find the guts to put economic and hard security on top of the bilateral agenda with Moscow. It cannot shrug its shoulders to the routine violations of Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian, Polish, Finnish, Swedish, or British airspaces by Russian warplanes. And now that Russia is a member of the World Trade Organization, the EU can call out Moscow for its suspicious trade blockades, like Russia did with European meat, fish, and milk exports. Moreover, as Europe’s neighborhood has become Russia’s near abroad, Europeans must work to stabilize this region, which is important for energy supplies or immigration challenges. But Moscow’s refusal to reduce its military presence in the region’s frozen conflicts has kept certain countries in dysfunction for over a decade. And in the cases of Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South-Ossetia, Russia’s growing military and diplomatic presence in these breakaway provinces seems to be a direct challenge to Moldovan and Georgian aspirations to seek closer ties with the European Union. For Europe, maintaining dialogue and cooperation with Russia is important, but it cannot do so by resorting to its usual laissez-faire attitude. A failure to address the tough questions would only lead to more stagnation. |
POLAND SEEKS ROBUST EU-RUSSIA POLICY |
POLAND SEEKS ROBUST EU-RUSSIA POLICY
Euobserver.com With the Polish EU presidency in 2011, Warsaw hoped its pragmatic approach gave it more clout in EU discussions on Russia policy. But despite the change in tone, Mr Tombinski said the "modernisation" initiative should take into account some difficult questions about Russia's intentions. "It would be a danger if the EU, by engaging with Russia didn't actually help it to modernise itself. If the EU, for example, with the new 'partnership' allowed a transfer of know-how that strengthened the powers of its military and security bodies and put at risk the development of civil society and the rule of law," he said. |
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UK and foreign policy |
'British Influence', a new independent advocacy campaign that wants Britain to lead in Europe, published an article on 'Britain's objectives in the world' that argues that it is the duty of every government to promote world-wide interests and to fulfill world-wide responsibilities. The viewpoint says that "our capacity to handle these critical foreign policy challenges, even if it did ever exist, has vanished", wonders how is that best done in the kaleidoscopically shifting circumstances of the post-Cold War world, where the symptoms of a new world disorder and the impact of the great financial and economic crisis of 2008 complicate the process of policy-making, and raises the question what the priorities are among those interests and responsibilities.
One thing is very clear. The capacity to handle these critical foreign policy challenges entirely on our own, even if it ever did exist, has vanished. We need dependable allies and actions concerted with others to handle every one of those challenges – from climate change, to free trade and financial stability, to instability in the Middle East, to nuclear proliferation. And the interdependence of today's world means that this is the worst possible moment to turn in on ourselves. Ever since the Second World War, Britain has been at the forefront of efforts to create, and to strengthen international institutions such as the UN the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation, and to build islands of rules-based stability within an often pretty chaotic context. We surely need now to persevere with those efforts and above all to give a lead in providing the emerging countries of the developing world with a more prominent and influential role in global decision making. If that means some diminution in our own influence in those bodies, it could be a price worth paying. And we need too to give a new impetus to cooperation in the G20, whose early successes seem now to have given way to drift. Reforming international organisations and making them more fit for purpose is often uphill, frustrating work but it needs to be done. Which is why I applaud the government's commitment to overseas aid and the Prime Minister's joint chairmanship of the UN panel set up to chart the way forward on the post-2015 Millennium Development Goals. Speculation about its waning power and influence are greatly exaggerated. When the European countries and the United States agree they can be an extraordinarily effective force for achieving our shared values and objectives; when we disagree or fall out we merely frustrate each other's aims. So we need a strong dialogue across the field of foreign policy; and we should seize the opportunity of freeing up trade and investment between the European Union and the US from the myriad of obstacles that still impede it. Completion of the single market, further enlargement to stabilise the Balkans and to cement the relationship with Europe's most rapidly growing economy, Turkey, giving a lead to international action on climate change are all obvious parts of such an agenda. But it should go wider than that. The impact of austerity on all of our defence budgets should surely be concentrating our minds on the need for closer cooperation and for making more effective use of the European Defence Agency; and Britain and France are necessary leaders in any such enterprise. That positive agenda is the only realistic framework for a successful effort to work for reform of the European Union, which vetoes, no-go areas and red lines will never be able to deliver. It is also the only realistic framework for sustaining Britain's world-wide influence, which doubts over the durability of our membership will only undermine. And the clout of the European Union in working for better access to those rapidly growing countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa is something we cannot afford to do without. No doubt the biggest obstacles to achieving our foreign policy objectives in the coming years will arise from unexpected events, which no amount of careful advance planning can hope to anticipate. That is the case for a foreign policy which is pragmatic, flexible and adaptable and not one driven by too much ideology and too many prejudices. |
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Parag Khanna |
Influential scientist and publicist, advisor of Barack Obama during the elections, proclaimed as 'Young Global Leader 2009' by World Economic Forum and also author of the book 'The Second World: Empires and influence in the new global order' (2008), in which he explains how the hegemony position of America make place for a kind of geopolitical marketplace, in which the US, China and the EU compete with each other about influence in the world, lectured 4-2-2010 on world politics and the role in that for the weight of the EU.
Direction of the world with an absolutely construction the EU, from Latin America till the China periferie. (Multi-) diplomacy will become of solid importance and 3 styles are to be recognized: coalition style, consensus style and consultancy style. Another important item is expanding the EU. Thinking of Turkey (between Balkans and Caucasus), not expanding is not wise. Now there is momentum. Furthermore relationships with China, Central Asia (where in fact the West officially lost the new "Great Game' about the 20-year competition for natural resources and influence), solutions for AFPAK and the Middle East, attention for the African Union, economic and financial access urges for common European foreign policy. And finally Iran as exercise for Europe's foreign politics. Parag Khanna is an Indian American author and international relations expert. He currently serves as the Director of the Global Governance Initiative of the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, a think tank based in Washington, D.C. His first book is entitled The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, and was published by Random House in March 2008. He attended the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Freie Universität Berlin, majoring in international affairs and then earning a Master of Arts in Security Studies. He is currently working on his PhD in international relations at the London School of Economics. He has worked as an analyst for the Council on Foreign Relations, the World Economic Forum and the Brookings Institution. In 2007, he was a geopolitical advisor to the United States Special Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. More recently, Khanna has provided expert advice and opinion to the Presidential campaign of Barack Obama, and is a member of the Board of Independent Diplomat. Khanna has contributed to numerous television programs and newspapers. His article, "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony", was the cover story on the New York Times Magazine on January 27, 2008. He coined the term "geopolitical marketplace" to refer to the dynamic where the "first world" superpowers (US, EU and China) compete for the influence of the "second world." |
By "second world," Khanna refers to those pivotal regions in the Middle East, Latin America, Central and South Asia, East Asia, and Eastern Europe. Countries in the second world, like Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Colombia, Brazil, India, Russia, Libya, Vietnam and Malaysia, simultaneously have both first world and third world characteristics.
They engage in multi-alignment vis-a-vis the US, EU, and China. |